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 ABSTRACT 
The political debate on gene technology, concerning the technology of cloning, has raised 
a lot of questions on ethics, political strategies and research programs. The debate raised 
new heights after the controversial news about the cloned sheep, Dolly. The political 
debate in Norway has been concerned about how to regulate and control the gene 
technology development. All the questions have in common that they are all mainly 
focusing on the eventual risks and threats to human life posed by gene technology. The 
debate is as such situated in a risk perspective, where the risks and threats are seen 
mainly as products of science and technology. The Norwegian legislative debate within 
the Norwegian Parliament (Storting) has resulted in a restrictive law, which forbid 
producing genetically identical individuals.  
 
I have analysed the political arguments through a religious, a scientific and an aesthetic 
ideal-typical position. The three ideal-types represent differentiated ways of debating and 
understanding risk posed by gene technology. The paradox is that the debate has a shared 
base, a shared political platform, among the politicians, which overlaps the ideal-typical 
distinctions. This means that the arguments are partly blurring the traditional party-
political boundaries. The shared political view is based on an agreement to put restriction 
and prohibition on the agenda. 
 
KEYWORDS: 
- Cloning and gene technology. 
- Risk. 
- Politics and values. 
- The religious, the scientific ideal-type. 
 
 I 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
Thanks to both of my very helpful supervisors,  
for their support and constructive feedback. 
Thanks to my good friend,  
helping me with the language. 
Thanks to my very good friends,  
being there for me. 
Thanks to my children, 
patiently waiting for their mother. 
 
 
Special thanks to my Supervisors: 
Professor Thorben Hviid Nielsen.  
Cand.Philol. and PhD-scholar ship holder Kristin Asdal. 
 
Good friend helping with language: Gudfrid Vågslid. 
Very good friends: You know who you are. 
Children: Anemone and Andreas. 
 II 
 
 
 PREFACE – SITUATING THE AUTHOR OF THIS THESIS 
I have been working as a bioengineer in a clinical chemistry laboratory, and studied 
sociology and theories about work-organizations. After dealing with technology and big 
machines in the laboratory I wanted study something that combined the technological and 
the social. I moved from a very practical work and a laboratory in which technologies and 
machines were playing an important role, to a theoretical work and a knowledge-based 
academic laboratory in which books, narratives and theoretical concepts are playing the 
important role. This laboratory is also filled with technology, but in another sense than 
my first chemistry lab. In my first lab I had to deal directly with the technology. The 
main technological purpose was to analyse and measure properly. At this laboratory I 
have to write a thesis about technology. It is different to deal directly with technology in 
a chemistry lab, and to be distanced and describe science, technology and society, and it 
has been a challenge to translate the technology to theory. It has been interesting to be 
enrolled in the university network and the ESST-program. But it has not been without 
anti-programs! There have been, and still are, actors who are interested to enrol me in a 
quite different network. In particular this concerns my children, and I do look forward to 
be enrolled in their network again. 
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 READING GUIDE 
The introduction states the reason for the starting point for my thesis and the chosen 
problem. I will further present an outline over the method and the selection of the 
material that I have done.  
 
Chapter 1 has the purpose to situate the debate about cloning that has taken place in the 
Norwegian Parliament1 (Storting). I will then situate the three ideal-types, which are 
applied in the analysis of the political cloning debate. 
 
Chapter 2 is a theoretical part and an introduction of the three ideal-types. I have tried to 
put the ideal-types in a theoretical context in which I argue for the use of the ideal-types 
and discuss why they have been used. I will also present a critical discussion with respect 
to the three ideal-types.  
 
Chapter 3 presents my analysis of the political cloning debate in the Storting. The 
analysis is divided under three headings according to the three ideal-typical positions: 
The religious, the scientific and the aesthetic. 
 
Chapter 4 looks into the actual results and the concrete legislation that have been 
negotiated. The chapter also attempts to analyse and interpret the legislation; as a result 
of what I understand is a shared political ground. 
 
                                                          
1 I will from now use the Norwegian name of the Parliament, Storting, in my thesis. 
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 Chapter 5 presents a summary and a conclusion. I will in the conclusion argue for and 
discuss how and why I think it has been useful to analyse the debate through the three 
ideal-types. There are in particular three findings that I have found interesting. 
 
 2 
 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
The biotechnological development, and especially the cloning technology, has brought up 
new ethical aspects of technology and science. It has also lead to a desire to take control 
and regulate the development in fields that are seen as problematic. Mapping and 
sequencing the human genome is unlike many of the new technologies in that it directly 
affects all of us at a very personal level (Glasner, 2000:109). Cloning is also an example 
of a technology that directly affects us, because it explicitly brings up the question about 
what it means to be a human being (Kolata, 1997:5). This makes the cloning technology 
being controversial.  
 
On July 1996, the most famous lamb in history entered the world. Created in Edinburgh’s 
Roslin Institute, Dolly was born not from the union of a sperm and an egg, but from the 
genetic material from another sheep (Ibid:4). Dolly was the first creature to be cloned 
from an adult cell in this way. The news that a sheep had been created by cloning adult 
non-reproductive tissue, has given rise to speculation that it may soon be feasible to 
create human beings in the same way. The news about the cloned sheep, Dolly, raised 
debates all over the world, also in the Norwegian Storting and it leaded to concrete results 
in the form of new legislation (Jølle Dahl, 1999:2).  
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 PROBLEM AND METHOD 
The aim with this thesis is to analyse the political debates about cloning that have taken 
place in the Storting. The analysis is here restricted to the political debates about cloning 
in the period 1997-2000. The analysis will be done through three different cultural and 
ideal-typical views concerning risks posed by gene technology. More specifically: I want 
to emphasize the politicians’ different forms of arguments in the legislative process 
toward the formulation of a new law. This law is § 3a-1, and is about medical use of 
biotechnology. 
 
I want to analyse the political debates about cloning through three ideal-types, or three 
cultural positions of risks related to bio- and gene technology. These are ideal-types 
applied from the book The Risk Society and Beyond. Critical Issues for Social Theory 
(Adam, B., Beck, U., Van Loom, J.). This book is a gathering of articles from different 
contributors. One of the contributors is Howard Caygill, who is Professor of Cultural 
History at University of London. His contribution is the book is Liturgies of Fear: 
Biotechnology and Culture (Adam et al., 2000). He illustrates the range of perspectives 
within contemporary culture by three ideal-typical responses to the threat of 
biotechnology. I will critically discuss the method I have chosen of using the ideal-types, 
in chapter 2. 
 
The thesis is mainly concentrated around political debates in the Norwegian Parliament, 
Stortinget, which brings up different aspects connected to the question about cloning. The 
selected debates are found by search on ‘cloning’ on the Norwegian Parliament’s web 
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 site (http://www.stortinget.no). The debates I have included in the analysis are limited to 
the Norwegian political debates that have taken place in the Storting in the period 1997-
2000. I found, by searching on the web site of the Storting and on actual links applied 
there, documents containing ‘cloning’ in various concerns. I found in particular two 
debates, which were in accordance to my purpose with this thesis. They were selected 
after reading the documents closely. There are in particular two debates I have found of 
interest with respect to the Norwegian political cloning debate in the Storting. Both are 
from 1997 and had their origin in reactions attached to the cloned sheep, Dolly. I have 
selected some debates from the Odelsting2 in addition to the debates from the Storting, 
one from 1998 and the other one from 2000. Both debates are recommendations for 
amendments regarding the law on medical use of biotechnology. The bill3 was an ensuing 
from the resolution in the Storting. The Storting made an appeal to the Government to 
place a motion on the need for legislative additions to the law, § 3a-1. The 
recommendations imply that the law (§ 3a-1) regarding medical use of biotechnology, 
should be changed. I have collectively denoted these debates, which have taken place in 
the Storting and in the Odelsting in the period 1997-2000, for the cloning debate. The 
main attention in the analysis is based on the debates in the Storting from 07.03.1997 and 
from 21.03.1997. The debates in the Odelsting and the votes are just functioning as 
support material, and are not analysed so deeply as the mentioned debates in the Storting.  
 
 
 
                                                          
2 The Norwegian Odelsting: The larger division of the Norwegian Parliament, Storting. 
3 In Norwegian: Lovendring. 
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 CHAPTER 1 – SITUATING THE CLONING DEBATE 
Generally one can claim that new knowledge and technology not only represent 
possibilities in people’s mind, but also risks (Hviid Nielsen et al., 2000:236). The 
reception of the gene technology has been characterized by hope and scepticism in 
Norway (Ibid:272, 273), which reflects the complexity that considerations of 
technological risks represent. The focus on the precautionary principle4 has increased in 
treatment of technologies where the consequences are difficult to predict. The 
precautionary principle emerged internationally after the important Rio-conference about 
environment and development in 1992 (Ibid). The precautionary principle implies that 
one has to try to avoid the risk before one has precisely knowledge about it. In Norway 
the precautionary principle was put to use in 1993 in relation to the legislative process 
regarding the gene technology5. The considerations of Genetic Modified Organisms 
(GMO) were on the political agenda in this matter. Outspread of GMO became strictly 
regulated in Norway, before negative effects had been observed (Ibid:237). The risks for 
unpredicted and incidental results by producing and consuming GMO mobilized a 
restrictive political manner. And when the cloned sheep, Dolly, entered the world, the 
anxiety for the moral consequences, related to gene technology, was also mobilized 
(Ibid:256). Gene technology activates both hope and scepticism, and in the Storting the 
scepticism is explicitly expressed with respect to gene technology (Cf. The precautionary 
principle). This scepticism is connected to risks posed by gene technology, both the 
health- and environmental risks, but also the risk for moral and ethical erosion and 
disintegration. This is the point of departure for my thesis, and I have therefore situated 
                                                          
4 In Norwegian: Føre-var prinsippet. 
5 The Norwegian Gene technology law. http://www.bion.no/html/genteknologiloven.html 
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 the cloning debate within a risk perspective. More specifically I will emphasize how the 
politicians are debating and try to find the arguments they use in the legislative process, 
which means the political arguments that lie behind the legislation. Much has to be read 
between the lines in the political debates in the Storting6. The most interesting may as 
such be what the text not explicitly express, i.e. which arguments and alternatives that are 
not mentioned. I want to emphasize the political arguments with respect to three cultural 
and construed risk perspectives related to gene technology: a scientific, a religious and an 
aesthetic ideal-type. 
 
I want to situate these three cultural terms, or ideal-types, in what Ulrich Beck calls the 
risk society. However, I do not intend to go closer into the interesting debates and 
challenges that Beck’s work has initiated7. I just refer to the risk society, because it 
similarly to the three ideal-types, sees risk primary as a product of technology and 
science (Beck, 1997:27). The three ideal-types illustrate that the product of technology 
and science pose a risk to the future of human life, and that this risk may be understood 
within diverse cultural interpretations of risk.  
 
1.1 – SITUATING THE IDEAL-TYPES 
Ulrich Beck postulates with his concept about the risk society, that the new risks are 
primary a product of science and technology (Ibid). In the book The risk society and 
beyond. Critical Issues for Social Theory (Adam, Beck, Van Loon (Ed.)) the contributors 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
6 Debates in the Norwegian Parliament (Storting). 
7 Cf. Hilary Rose in Adam et al., Risk, Trust and Skepticism in the Age of the New Genetics. Living with 
risk but not in a risk society. Pp 63-74. 
 7 
 
 
 are engaged with two examples of Big Science8: nuclear physics and genetics (Adam et 
al., 2000:17). The contributors are all engaged in risks related to Big Science. Big 
Science is characterized by large amounts of incoming economic capital, in the form of 
government funds and business sponsorship as well as high amounts of political, social 
and symbolic capital (Ibid). The contributors in the book are challenging Big Science in 
different ways. However, they are all taking a position that is to challenge taken-for-
granted assumptions and established conventions, such as those ruling the rationalization, 
accreditation and legitimation of Big Science (Ibid:22). The contribution of Howard 
Caygill points towards the transformative aspects of risk embodiment. Caygill’s concern 
is risks associated to biotechnology, and he illustrates the range of perspectives by three 
ideal-typical responses to the threat of gene- and biotechnology9. He presents the 1995 
encyclical letter of Pope John Paul II10, and a 1992 report by a working party of the 
British Medical Association (MBA)11 and a work of the Australian performance artist, 
Stelarc12 (Adam and van Loon in Adam et al., 2000:25).  
 
Caygill is stating that the perceived risk to human life posed by biotechnology and the 
anxiety which surrounds it, are proving a central and productive feature of contemporary 
culture (Caygill, 2000:155). The range of perspectives contained within this emergent 
culture is illustrated by a religious, a scientific and an aesthetic work. These three genres 
can be understood as particular ways of translating the heterogeneous contingency of 
                                                          
8 Gene technology is a good example of Big Science. However, the contributors are not taking the concept 
of Big Science as a fact, but attempt to challenge the concept in different ways. 
9 I do not make distinction between biotechnology and gene technology here, even though they have 
different connotations. However, it makes no differences in this sense.  
10 Evangelium Vitae: the Value and Inviolability of Human Life. 
11 Our Genetic Future: The Science and Ethics of Genetic Technology. 
12 Performances since the late 1980s. 
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 genetic risks. Each of these texts and works attempt to frame the threat posed by gene 
technology in terms of an existing repertoire of cultural interpretation and resistance 
(Caygill, 2000:156). These three cultural strategies highlight that there is never simply a 
mediation of risk (Adam and van Loon in Adam et al., 2000:25). Caygill’s work is to 
illustrate that mediation of risk is culturally dependent, and that each of the terms of 
existing cultural codes, in this case the religious, scientific and aesthetic, all attempt to 
frame the threat to human life posed by biotechnology. His attempt is to demonstrate that 
in each case the cultural codes are themselves challenged and transformed13. I do not 
intend to go deeply into the transformations and the challenges of the cultural codes, 
which could be a very interesting, but a more theoretical work. I intend to make a 
descriptive analysis of the political arguments. I will just use the three cultural codes as 
three ideal-typical frameworks in the analysis of the political debates concerning the 
technology of cloning.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 Cygill is not using ideal-types for claiming that ideal-types are complete for mediation of risk. 
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 CHAPTER 2 – INTRODUCTION OF THE IDEAL-TYPES 
Ideal-type is a concept introduced by the German sociologist, Max Weber14. An ideal-
type is not necessarily an ethical ideal, but an analytical construction in which typical 
characters attached to a social phenomenon are emphasized. Ideal-types do not say 
everything about reality, and they have limitations in their function as models and 
concepts for explanation. On the other hand, ideal-types may be useful for analysing 
complexities. Ideal-types are functioning as analytical constructions and may structure a 
complex analysis where distinctive and characteristic comparisons are necessary. Weber 
stresses that knowledge15 can never be unbiased or a simple reflection over state of 
affairs. The researcher must necessarily work due to theoretical constructions: exposed to 
the enormous, chaotic flow of events that runs through time, the researcher must work 
with ideal-types or ‘pure’ archetypes (Weber, 1971:199-200). Hence, the ideal-type is not 
a description of reality, but is used to give distinctive expressions to the description. The 
researcher constructs abstract ideal-types as a tool for research, not as a goal, but as a 
means. Thus, the ideal-type is not a classification system, but a theoretical construction 
and an analytical model, which serves as a resource for orientation (Fivelsdal, 1995:XIII). 
The challenge is to find out how close or how far the ideal-type is from reality. It is also a 
challenge not to mix ideal-type and reality. One might be tempted to commit violence 
upon reality to strengthen the construction’s validity within the world of reality. I will not 
go closer into the entire methodological debate about use of ideal-types in general. I will 
later return to the question concerning why it has been useful to apply the ideal-types in 
my analysis.  
                                                          
14 Max Weber (1864-1920) cf. The Spirit of Capitalism and the Protestant Ethic. 
15 Knowledge within the terms of epistemology. 
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 I want to operate with three different ideal-types, which in each particular way is devoted 
to frame an ideal-typical view upon risk regarding the future of human life, posed by 
biotechnology. These three ideal-types are the religious, the scientific and the aesthetic 
and are all borrowed and inspired from the contribution of Howard Caygill in Liturgies of 
Fear: Biotechnology and Culture (Caygill, 2000:155-164). 
 
The three ideal-types are not produced by Caygill with the purpose to describe a complete 
understanding of risk, but they are his interpretations over the three mentioned works 
regarding biotechnology. Hence, the ideal-types should be regarded as Caygill’s 
interpretation of three particular works, and that each and one of these works can be 
understood respectively within a religious, a scientific and an aesthetic view. The three 
works, according to Caygill, are representing three different cultures, or cultural codes, in 
which risk and threat to human life are perceived. These three cultures are described as 
the religious, the scientific and the aesthetic, and each and one of the cultures are 
respectively representing an ideal-typical position regarding risk and threat. Caygill uses 
the encyclical letter from Pope John Paul II being representative for the religious ideal-
type, the MBA-report being representative for the scientific ideal-type and the 
performances and interviews of the artist, Stelarc, being representative for the aesthetic 
ideal-type. 
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 2.1 – THE RELIGIOUS IDEAL-TYPE  
The religious ideal-typical position asserts the uniqueness of an individual human life. 
The threat to the human life posed by the evidence of genetics, is the risk of undermining 
the purity of the individual’s position in the world. 
 
Focus: 
- The human being is inviolable and has a spiritual integrity as God’s creation. The 
human being represents the life, and everyone has an inherent value and an important 
role to play in life. 
- It is not given to the human being to decide what constitute a valuable life or an 
efficient society. This implies that human embryos should not be considered as just 
raw material (means), but as a goal in itself. This is close to a deontological view, 
inspired by the philosopher, Kant.   
- The arguments are based on theological arguments and Christian belief. 
 
Risks and threats posed by biotechnology: 
- Biotechnology is a central feature of the ’culture of death’, which in the wake of 
liberal individualism and moral relativism has made it difficult to maintain a grasp on 
the meaning of the human, its rights and obligations. 
- Those engaged in genetic research and the development of techniques of artificial 
reproduction, are in the vanguard of the ’culture of death’. Especially in so far as they 
regard their object of research – human embryos – as raw material for research or 
technological manipulation. 
 12 
 
 
  
Challenge to the religious cultural code: 
- The fertilized cell, or the cloned cell, as conceived by genetics cannot accord to the 
traditional position of the Church regarding the integrity of human personality. The 
challenge is to fight for the human being in order to protect its value and uniqueness. 
- The promotion of a ’culture of life’ entails a wide-ranging cultural politics entailing a 
general mobilization of conscience and a common ethical effort to promote a grand 
strategy in favour of life. 
 
The religious message is that human beings represent the ’culture of life’, but the human 
dignity is attacked by those engaged in genetic research. The religious ideal-type attempt 
to frame the risk to the future of human life posed by biotechnology, within the frame of 
risk posed by the ’culture of death’. The ’culture of death’ is a threat to the human life, 
because it threatens the dignity, integrity and spirituality of the ’culture of life’. 
 
2.2 – THE SCIENTIFIC IDEAL-TYPE  
The scientific ideal-typical position asserts the importance of enlightenment. The threat to 
human life posed by genetics is the ignorance of scientific and professional knowledge.  
 
Focus: 
- The increased knowledge of genetics and a broader diffusion of its results will create 
a community capable of making informed assessments of the risks involved in a 
given genetic therapy. 
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 - Biotechnology and genetic modification are in themselves morally neutral. It is the 
uses or abuses to which they are put that create ethical dilemmas16.  
- If the dilemmas remain the same, and are only magnified by the increase in 
knowledge and its application, then it may theoretically be possible in the future to 
gain sufficient knowledge to minimize the risks of its technological application. 
 
Risks and threats posed by biotechnology: 
- The human being will always be threatened by physical and genetic illnesses. 
However, the most significant threat to life is ignorance and lack of knowledge and 
information. 
- This ignorance, or ‘culture of ignorance’, produces the typical effects of uncritical 
support and uncritical rejection of biotechnology. The threat to life is the ‘culture of 
ignorance’, which surrounds genetics, both among the lay public and in the medical 
professions. This is a risk in itself. 
- The ‘culture of ignorance’ with its lack of critical judgment of the future, makes it 
difficult to achieve an optimal future: one which maximizes the benefits of genetic 
modification and minimizes the harms. 
- The uses of the technology may give harmful results, and the threat to human life and 
future is insufficient knowledge about the effects of the technology. 
 
 
 
                                                          
16 Ethical dilemmas in the meaning of unfavourable environmental and health consequences caused by 
using the technology. 
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 Challenge to the scientific code: 
- The challenge is how to achieve sufficient knowledge for making it possible to 
predict risks and to accumulate sufficient knowledge to minimize the risk produced 
by the same increase in knowledge. 
- Ignorance should be countered by the creation of an informed culture. The 
mobilization of an informed culture has the aspiration of informing the public about 
science and genetics. The strategy involves remedying both the knowledge deficit of 
the lay public and the ethical deficiency of the medical profession. 
 
By stating that technology is morally neutral in itself, the scientific ideal-type puts only 
the effects of the technology as ethical problematic. This in turn transcends the 
technology from norms and ethics.  
 
2.3 – THE AESTHETIC IDEAL-TYPE 
The aesthetic ideal-typical culture positions risk quite different from the religious and the 
scientific ideal-type. Risk and threat to human life is not, according to the aesthetic ideal-
type, the technology or the use and results of the technology. Not exploiting the 
possibilities and the technological potentials are the risk-perspective in this aesthetic 
cultural position. 
 
Focus: 
- The human being is a potential for re-organizing the body and redefining the limits 
and character of human life. The human being is to be considered as raw material and 
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 possibilities for technological enhancement. Hence, the human being is host for 
micro-technological mechanisms, which effectuate changes and improvements. 
- The possibility of technologically manipulating atoms at a molecular level, which is 
nano-technology, promises to transform the human body. In this position there is an 
uncompromising faith in science and technology, opposed to the religious position.  
 
Risks and threats posed by biotechnology: 
- The threat to human life is, not being able to use the technological potentials, and the 
existence of resistance against technological development.    
- The ‘culture of life’ and the ‘informative culture’ are therefore a threat to the 
‘aesthetic culture’.  
 
Challenge to the aesthetic code: 
- The challenge is to blur the distinction between reproductive and non-reproductive 
cell therapies. This is because the ‘aesthetic culture’ makes no distinction between the 
purposes of the technology. 
- The mobilization is to avoid technological scepticism and resistance against use of 
technology. Hence, the main challenge is to loosen the restrictive laws and directions, 
but rather accept that the technology should control and rule.  
 
The aesthetic message and the biotechnological logic are here drawn to the extreme. The 
extreme naturalism combined with the ambition to use the human body as an object of 
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 technological and artistic manipulation is, according to the ‘culture of life’ and the 
‘informative culture’, making the human being more inhuman.  
 
All the three ideal-typical positions attempt to frame the risk to the future of human life 
posed by biotechnology. Howard Caygill’s contribution is to show that these three 
cultural strategies are themselves transformed in the process. Through his critical 
illumination of cultural strategies, he emphasizes that there are different cultural 
interpretations and constructions of risks. All of the three works17 that Caygill gives 
attention to, is in each particular way black-boxing18 technology: The religious in the 
name of the totality of theological knowledge. The scientific in claiming that biological 
research and biotechnology are in themselves ethically neutral. The aesthetic in the 
uncompromising faith in technology. I do not intend to go further into a debate of the 
limits and challenges of these specific ideal-typical positions19. My intention is to use the 
three ideal-typical positions as a tool in the analysis. 
 
2.4 – CRITICAL DISCUSSION 
The ideal-types give attention to risks and threat to the future of human life posed by 
biotechnology. The three ideal-types are devoted to illustrate three different cultural 
perspectives of risk posed by biotechnology. In this context risk is defined as the 
eventually harmful effects posed by bio- and gene technology. It is the diverse definitions 
                                                          
17 Evangelium Vitae: the Value and Inviolability of Human Life, Our Genetic Future: The Science and 
Ethics of Genetic Technology and the work of an Australian performance artist. 
18 Black-boxing is to see the artefact, or technology, as taken-for-granted. In this matter the risk posed by 
biotechnology is based on some a priori assumptions, which one could say is sort of black-boxing the 
technology and its risk to human life, because the a priori assumptions are taken for granted. 
19 Caygill attempts to illustrate that these ideal-types are themselves transformed and challenged in the 
process of cultural interpretation. 
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 of these eventually harmful effects and the implicit assumptions that lie behind the 
comprehension of these definitions, which may be understood as three cultural positions 
of risk. Hence, one may also understand the three ideal-types as three cultural and 
construed approaches. It is important, as Haraway says, to be aware: We are all 
Cyborgs20 and parts of social technostories. Each technostory construe what it seems to 
disclose (Haraway, 1988). This is also the matter in this case. This technostory attempts 
to tell how one may disclose the political debates regarding cloning and its risk to human 
life. I want to interpret how the politicians understand risks and threats related to cloning 
technology, through three diverse cultural terms. I want through this story, to disclose the 
politicians’ implicit assumptions and values in the debates about cloning. 
 
There are some questions concerning to the use of such a three-divided division. These 
questions should be clarified before the analysis, because they are important to remember 
in the reading of the interpretation and conclusion. The first one is as I have mentioned 
before, to have in mind that risk and threat are conceptions that might be seen as 
constructions: Not in their existence, but in their cultural interpretation and perception. 
The religious, the scientific and the aesthetic position may thus be understood as three 
construed positions that become real because people believe in them.  
 
The second question touches upon the incompleteness of the ideal-types. Arguments that 
might not be specific enough, according to the ideal-typical framework, might be 
consigned to the outside and hence ignored and abandoned. They might be treated as 
                                                          
20 The Cyborg is a metaphor in describing that we are all hybrids of organism and technology, fiction and 
facts, myths and reality (Asdal et al., 1998:39).  
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 insignificant in the interpretation and in the analysis. However, in a research paper in 
which the purpose is to disclose methodological insufficiency, these arguments might be 
quite appropriate in challenging the legitimation of the use. However, this paper has not 
the intention or the purpose to demonstrate that each and one of three ideal-types are 
complete. Nor do I assume that the three ideal-types are complete with respect to the 
analysis. I state as premises that ideal-types are construed frameworks, and I have not the 
intention to elaborate the transformative and challenging aspects of the ideal-types.   
 
The scientific ideal-type considers the technology as morally neutral, but the moral 
neutrality is threatened by the use of it. It is the uses to which biotechnology and genetic 
modification are put that create dilemmas. This view is in opposition to the religious 
ideal-type, which considers biotechnology as morally reprehensible in itself. The 
religious ideal-typical view implies that norms, ethics and moral are inscribed within the 
technology, and the uses should be seen in relation to the technology itself. This view is 
close to the conception of the ‘seamless web’. The seamless web stresses that it is never 
clear a priori and independent of context whether a problem should be treated as technical 
or social (Bijker, 1995:273). The religious ideal-typical view is in this sense taking the 
seamless web into account, but it differs from the very concept of the seamless web: the 
religious view is taking religious ethics as a priori premises, which should be transcribed 
into the technology. The scientific ideal-typical view is taking the moral neutrality as an a 
priori premise, in which the technical is morally neutral, but the social is manufacturing 
the ethical dilemmas. The aesthetic ideal-typical view is taking technological fascination 
and possibilities as imperatives for technological enhancement. These distinctions 
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 between the social and technical are not in accordance with the principle of symmetry21. 
The ideal-typical frameworks can thus be challenged by theories that take the principle of 
symmetry into account. The ideal-typical views are all relying on some a priori 
assumptions, and hence displaying some convergent features. Each presents risks posed 
by biotechnology and attempts to frame cultural responses, which will either counter or 
promote the feared or desired future (Caygill in Adam et al., 2000:156). I circumscribed 
before that I would not intend to go deeply into the transformations and the challenges to 
the cultural codes that lie behind the ideal-types. My intention here is just to point out 
that the ideal-typical cultural codes can be challenged. The challenges and the convergent 
feature may also be seen as a critique of the ideal-types as framework. But as mentioned 
before, ideal-types are not sufficient for describing the complexity of the world. I have 
not taken completeness as a premise in the analysis, and the challenges to the cultural 
codes display that these three are themselves transformative.  
 
The third question I want to draw attention to is about the flexibility or rigidity of the 
ideal-typical concept. Ideal-types may be accused of being too strictly as an analytical 
framework, and hence for giving an enclosed or stiffened interpretation of social 
phenomena and how reality might be understood. Thus, it is important to be aware that 
this interpretation might not be the only one conceivable. Ideal-types are meant to 
structure, categorize and position understandings, which are necessary in attempts to 
differentiate and reflect over social contexts. Frameworks are necessarily needed in 
analysis and interpretations, even though they might be insufficient in their interpretation 
                                                          
21General symmetry (Callon on sociotechnology): Symmetrical with respect to explaining the social world 
and the technical world (Bijker, 1995:275).  
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 and reflection of complexities. However, I want to argue for the usefulness of analysing 
by applying these ideal-types in this descriptive work. My purpose is to draw attention to 
the politicians’ different forms of arguments in the legislative process toward the 
concretion of a law concerning medical use of biotechnology (Cf. Besl.O.nr.27 (1997-
1998)). My analysis is dependent on an analytical framework in order to illuminate the 
political arguments. I will later return to why it has been useful to apply these ideal-types. 
 
Implications 
In the book, The Risk Society and Beyond. Critical Issues for Social Theory, are Barbara 
Adam, Ulrich Beck and Joost Van Loon and other contributors, as Howard Caygill, 
advocating a social theory that takes heed of the consequences of living in a risk society 
(Adam et al., 2000). In a risk society, they argue, even the most restrained and moderate-
objectivist account of risk implications involves a hidden politics, ethics and morality 
(Adam and van Loon in Adam et al., 2000:1). To face a decision about whether to 
acknowledge or ignore the ethico-political implications is, would Beck say, the 
foundation of reflexive modernization and the inescapable self-confrontation that 
accompanies the contemporary industrial way of life (Beck et al.,1994:5). This reflexivity 
has implications for how to critically treat the constellation of risks, technologies and the 
relationship to the future. I will try to draw attention to some implications that follow this 
reflexivity.  
 
The first implication I want to draw attention to is the necessary involvement of a sense 
of construction in the configuration of risk-perception. There is a need to understand risk 
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 construction as a practice of manufacturing particular uncertainties that may have 
harmful consequences to life in the broadest sense of the term. The essence of risk is not 
that it is happening, but it might be happening (Adam et al., 2000:2). Risks are in this 
reflexive context to be understood as manufactured not only through the application of 
technologies, but also in the making of sense. The contributors that are advocating a 
social theory that takes heed for living in a risk society, claim that risks are necessarily 
constructed, however, they are not constructed on the basis of voluntary imagination. 
Risks are being revealed in their construction (Ibid). This constructivist argument sees 
that the perceived and defined risks associated with gene technology are cultural 
dependent. The three ideal-types whether those of religion, science or aesthetic, bear 
witness to the diverse ways in which contemporary culture positions the risks posed by 
biotechnology. The three ideal-types may thus be understood as three cultural codes, 
which are dependent on a cultural context, a religious, a scientific or an aesthetic one. 
 
The second implication is the inevitability of the contested nature of these constructions 
as relations of risk-definition. Following the constructivist argument, all interpretation is 
inherently a matter of perspective and hence political (Ibid:4). This in turn puts those in a 
position to define and legitimate risks, the politicians in this case, in key positions. The 
inevitability of political involvement, the pervasiveness of mediation, the high level of 
indeterminacy mean that there is no one truth, that there are no facts outside the 
relativising influence of interpretations based on context, position, perspective, interests 
and the power to define and colour interpretation (Ibid). There can be no such thing as 
innocent knowledge as Haraway points out. Knowledge is inevitably tied to particular 
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 locations we inhabit, we all engage in situated knowledge (Haraway, 1988). Following 
this argument, knowledge is principally embodied, contextual and positional, and taking 
up a position and to be positioned is inevitably a question of ethics. The politicians that 
are in a position to make sense of risk are thus, following the argument, are involved both 
in the engendering and manipulation of risks, as well as in their negotiation and 
displacement.  
 
The modern thought has placed the traditional role of theory in creating structures in 
which knowledge could be developed (Adam et al., 2000:11). The use of the three ideal-
typical perspectives in the analysis is in this sense a particular practice of ordering 
knowledge. Such a role may seem rather inadequate to deal with the challenges of 
making sense. This inadequacy concerns, on the one hand, the irreducibility of the 
concept, and the multiplicity and complexity of the concept that are inherent in any 
ordering-framework that tries to establish general laws. In other words, it is too 
undistinguishing. On the other hand, however, the logic of structuring is inappropriately 
limited to the ring-fencing of its own categorical imperatives which engender the objects 
and objectives of this ordering of knowledge (Ibid). This is a paradoxical role. The 
implications in order to overcome this double-flaw, is to be aware that the construction of 
risks and ethics must obey the discourse of theirs revelation, and that all knowledge about 
gene- and biotechnological threats is mediated and as such dependent on interpretation.  
 
Discourses are says Haraway constituting and constructing practices (Asdal et al., 
1998:40). Following her argument, the political discourse as a technoscientific discourse, 
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 is productive and reflexive in the making of laws. The discourse is hence a part of the 
constitution and construction of definitions, understandings and interpretations of risks 
and threats posed by gene technology.  
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 CHAPTER 3 – ANALYSIS OF THE CLONING DEBATE 
In this part of the study I will try to point out the arguments used in the political debate 
on cloning. With respect to this debate the important thing is the politicians’ way of 
arguing, that is what arguments they put forth. In the analysis of the debate on cloning the 
arguments have been limited to the three ideal type conceptions of the hazards of gene 
technology. The aim of this analytical procedure is to show how the arguments used in 
the debate can be understood within the categories of the religious, the scientific and the 
aesthetic ideal-type. Arguments that can be attributed to one of the three different cultural 
positions and their way of viewing the risks concerning gene technology and cloning, tell 
us something about the implicit values on which the politicians base their arguments.  
 
3.1 – ISSUES ON THE AGENDA 
I have tried to extract the main lines in the parliamentary discussion of 07.03.1997 and 
21.03.1997. I will go on to discuss the issues on the agenda in relation to the three before 
mentioned ideal-types. The main concern of the political debate is how to maintain a 
sustainable society and find ways to secure a healthy development in biotechnology that 
serves mankind (Cf. The law on bio-technology and the law on gene technology). The 
Norwegian national assembly is opposed to unrestrained use and development of this 
technology. By questioning the possibilities of the technology, its use and its effects, the 
debate is focusing on aspects of the technology that seem dangerous and risky. It is the 
focus on risks that will serve as the basis of the analysis of the political debate on cloning. 
The three ideal types that I have mentioned represent three different ways of seeing the 
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 risks connected to gene technology. They all touch upon the threat to human life that 
gene technology represents. How is this threat treated in political discussions? 
 
As will be made clear later on in my analysis of the political debate, some arguments are 
easier to identify and are more easily attributed to one of the three ideal-types than others. 
The religious ideal type is apparently the category that has the most easily recognizable 
arguments. This is probably due to the fact that our political parties and our cultural 
legacy are based on Christian tradition. The scientific ideal-type has a more modern, 
rational foundation and is not as profound and philosophical in its ways of arguing. The 
rational arguments of the politicians lend themselves more easily to a scientific 
interpretation than the others. The aesthetic ideal-type is more extreme and its voice is 
usually not heard in the political discourse. The main part of the analysis will be 
concentrated on the religious and scientific ideal-types. One explanation of the apparent 
absence of the aesthetic ideal type in the political discussion, is that the other two have a 
less controversial outlook on human life, considering our general cultural understanding 
and Christian tradition. 
 
3.2 – RELIGIOUS IDEAL TYPE ARGUMENTS 
I will begin with the interpellation of 21.03.1997 made by the MP22 Marit Arnstad 
(Centre Party) to the Minister of Health 21.03.1997, as this debate was started with the 
intention to have a broad exchange of opinions on the development in gene technology 
(Arnstad  (Centre Party), Stortinget 21.03,1997:2). In this particular debate I have found 
arguments that lend themselves to a more specific religious interpretation, and I have 
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 chosen to focus my attention on the objects of discussion that are closest to the religious 
ideal-type. The other objects of discussion are more general, but still give rise to religious 
arguments. These topics will not be entered upon in this study. 
 
Stretching ethical boundaries 
With the cloning of Dolly as her starting point, Arnstad bases her interpellation on the 
wish for a broader debate on the aspects of gene technology. Arnstad feels that with this 
controversial cloning of an adult sheep, an important ethical line was crossed (Arnstad, 
Stortinget 21.03, 1997:1), and she goes on to say that the cloning of humans might be 
possible in the near future (Ibid). Subsequently an exaggerated picture of the 
development is drawn, with chilling predictions of human clones. It is an extreme point 
of view, but Arnstad uses these science-fiction images to illustrate the worst case 
scenarios of the technological development. The most important ethical barrier has, as 
she puts it, already been crossed with the cloning of Dolly. Attempting to clone animals, 
we have crossed one important line. If we use the same technology on humans, it would 
mean yet another transgression. 
 
In Arnstad’s opinion therefore, what we need is a political debate on the ethical and 
environmental aspects of gene technology, in order to take the right legislative measures 
with respect to the technological development (Ibid). As to the question of human 
cloning, Arnstad feels it is a boundary we should not cross. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
22 MP: Member of Parliament. 
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 Facing the question of human cloning, we have reached the last frontier as 
far as ethics are concerned. If we do not maintain this last barrier, it will 
no longer be possible to check the development at all. 
(Marit Arnstad (Centre party), Stortinget 21.03, 1997:2) 
 
Arnstad is backed on this point by several other politicians. Meltveit Kleppa (Centre 
Party) points out how difficult it is to draw lines, but she finds that only the prohibition of 
human cloning is compatible with Christian and humanist traditions (Stortinget 
21.03,1997:7). Frafjord Johnson feels we need to get the legislation in order as soon as 
possible, a legislation that prohibits cloning of humans, considering the fast development 
in gene technology (Stortinget 21.03, 1997:6). 
  
Anders Hornslien (Labour) continues the debate by asking where to draw the lines 
between what we can allow and what we cannot allow, which animals can be cloned and 
which not (Stortinget 21.03, 1997:6). 
 
Are we supposed to ban the cloning experiments that are carried out on 
bees at Ås23? Are we to draw the line at bees or at cows, mammals, other 
organisms, or cloning used in skin-transplants etc.? 
(Anders Hornslien (Labour), Stortinget 21.03, 1997:6) 
 
This Labour MP does not on the other hand give any answers himself, but he touches 
upon some of the essential questions in the debate, that is where to draw the line. 
Therefore, he goes on to say, it is important to have a continuous debate on this subject in 
                                                          
23 The Agricultural School in Norway. 
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 the Storting. Magnhild Meltveit Kleppa (Centre Party) gives a more substantial answer to 
the question of where to draw the line. She wants to prohibit cloning of animals and 
humans (Meltveit Kleppa, Stortinget 21.03, 1997:7). 
 
We have every reason to take those scientists seriously who point out the 
unknown risks that cloning might represent, themselves want to outlaw 
cloning, because they know how difficult it is to draw lines. This is also 
the only conclusion that is compatible with the Christian and humanist 
traditions that so far have secured the basis for the inalienable rights of 
each individual in our society.  
(Magnhild Meltveit Kleppa (Centre Party), Stortinget 21.03, 1997:7) 
 
To ban human cloning would in Kleppa’s view be the only justifiable thing to do, if we 
want to protect the inalienable rights of the individual. Considering that the Christian 
tradition emphasizes the rights of the individual, the cloning of humans brought about by 
scientists is, according to Meltveit Kleppa, incompatible with this view. It would be 
contending with the Christian tradition with regard to the Christian view on human 
integrity and individuality. 
 
Right-wing politician Annelise Høegh takes it further by saying that in addition to 
prohibiting cloning, we have a duty to make sure that ethical guidelines are followed 
when we decide to take new technology into use (Stortinget 21.03, 1997:7). Using the 
concept of duty, she is referring to ethics as well as to the technology.  
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 We have no obligation to allow anything that is technologically possible, 
but we have an obligation toward ethics (Høegh, Stortinget 21.03, 1997:7).  
 
She gives no straight forward answer to the question of what system of ethics to follow in 
controlling the use of gene technology. But claiming as she does that we have an 
obligation to be ethical, she is committing herself to a system of deontological or Kantian 
ethics, that is based on the concept of duty, deontology. Deontological ethics is the core 
of the Christian tradition (Thommesen et al., 1996:195). Both Meltveit Kleppa and 
Høegh are committed to the Christian tradition and to humanist values, and thereby they 
are bringing the concept of duty into the debate. As humans we have an obligation, as is 
clear from their arguments, to protect our natural environment and humanity within 
ourselves. The prohibition of cloning would be the alternative most consistent with the 
concept of duty, the Christian tradition and the humanist values. 
 
The question of ethical barriers being crossed is connected to the man’s position in 
nature. The politicians want to draw the line at human cloning because of the unique 
position that humans have with regard to other mammals. 
 
Man’s position 
Arnstad opposes the experimenting on animals to the experimenting on humans. The 
cloning of humans represents the last frontier, and this frontier needs to be protected 
through joint action. This is in line with the religious ideal type, according to which 
changes are made by people who stand united behind a consistent, wide-ranging ethical 
policy or strategy to protect life according to Christian and religious values (Caygill, 
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 2000:157). Arnstad is implying that the strategy to protect the ultimate ethical barrier is 
based on religious values, but she is not explicit on this point. But the notion of consistent 
action to protect mankind is present. 
 
The motivation behind this is that there are things that mankind should 
defend itself against through joint action. Human cloning represents a 
threat to human integrity and identity. It is an example of something that 
civilized societies should not accept. (Arnstad (Center Party), Stortinget 
21.03, 1997:2)  
 
The religious ideal-type sees human life as something sacred and inviolable, and that 
every human is valuable and has an important role to fill in life. When Arnstad sees 
human cloning as a threat it is because human integrity and identity is in danger of being 
destroyed or abused if we do not control the development of cloning. This argument rests 
on the conception that man is inviolable, and that man’s integrity and identity is tied to 
this inviolability, which we should be willing to protect. If we are not willing to protect 
the inviolability of man, we are jeopardizing the integrity and identity of civilized 
society. In this context, to protect human integrity and identity means to protect our 
genetic material. Our genetic material, our DNA or genes is consequently to be regarded 
as inviolable and sacred, it is what constitutes man’s integrity and identity. According to 
the religious ideal-type humans cannot decide what constitutes an efficient life and what 
does not. Human beings have unqualified value, but in an efficient society, the religious 
message claims, values are subordinated to economical and political efficiency (Caygill, 
2000:156). This on the other hand is not consistent with a religious position according to 
which humans have inherent value. Consequently one cannot allow humans to be used in 
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 research and experiments only as a means to an end, i.e. to make humans more efficient. 
Cloning of animals is being accepted and defended because scientific and vested interests 
(the medical industry) is hand in hand, says Arnstad. She mentions the Roslin institute in 
Scotland where Dolly was created as an example of this. The next-door neighbor of the 
institute is the medical company PPL Therapeutics, which is eager to put the technology 
used on Dolly into use (Stortinget 21.03, 1997:2). Arnstad finds this very disturbing from 
an ethical point of view, because it is not just a question of science, but also a question of 
money. She is concerned that making a profit will outweigh ethical considerations and 
the effects on society at large. The ideal of the ‘culture of life’ is man’s inherent and 
inalienable value, as opposed to man’s value being measured in money. She compares the 
cloning of animals to human cloning and finds many reasons to prohibit the cloning of 
animals as well. But her arguments are still different when it comes to her proposition to 
prohibit the cloning of animals. 
 
First of all she doesn’t claim that we have to protect the integrity and identity of animals, 
in other words, animals are not as inviolable and sacred as humans. But she emphasizes 
that we have to protect our natural environment. There is, according to this view, an 
important difference between animals and humans, and the superiority of man is taken as 
a given. This is consistent with theological arguments, which places man at the head of 
creation. In the book of Genesis God makes man the master of nature and puts him in 
charge of naming animals and plants. Man was created in God’s image.  
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 And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have 
dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl in the air, and over the cattle, and 
over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth  
(1. Book of Genesis 1:26).  
 
The religious ideal-type conception of man relates the sanctity of man to his 
responsibility towards the rest of creation. The sacredness of man is related to the fact 
that he is created in God’s image. Man’s superiority over all other creatures is 
consequently a sacred responsibility to protect the environment and ourselves. Man has 
an obligation to act according to this responsibility, because of our prerogative with 
regard to the rest of creation and because we are created in God’s image. When Arnstad 
opposes the cloning of animals it is because she sees that nature and the environment and 
man needs protection. And she sees it as mankind’s job to stand united in the fight to 
secure the ethical barriers. 
 
Hernes’ reply to Arnstad is of an open character, and his arguments are not as dependent 
on implicit values when it comes to ethical barriers and the question of what is sacred and 
what is not. But at one point he agrees with the religious argument about man’s unique 
position in nature. Before he gets to this point he treats the issue of possible 
environmental problems that might arise from the use of cloning. One of these problems 
is the possible loss of bio-diversity. Hernes bases his argument on information from the 
Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Environmental matters. But this problem is 
not necessarily a sufficient reason to ban the cloning of animals (Hernes, Stortinget 
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 21.03, 1997:4). Speaking of man’s position in nature, he too underlines the unique 
position of man with regard to other mammals. 
 
Finally I reach the question of cloning of the most advanced mammal we 
know, i.e. Homo sapiens. At the outset it seams easy to turn it down, but I 
think it is necessary to paint a more nuanced picture of the situation. 
(Gudmund Hernes (Minister of Health), Stortinget 21.03, 1997:4) 
 
Man’s position at the top of other creatures makes it easier to justify the prohibition of 
human cloning. But he still thinks we have to be less categorically negative towards the 
possible cloning of humans. Never the less, by granting man superiority over other 
mammals, he recognizes that human cloning needs a different and better justification than 
the cloning of other mammals. 
 
The superior position of man with respect to other animals is consistent Arnstad’s 
argument to the point that man has a special role in nature. But the conclusions that 
Hernes draws are not as drastic as those drawn by Arnstad. He says that even if the 
Ministry of environmental matters is concerned about the loss of bio-diversity, which 
might turn out to be a serious problem connected to cloning, he doesn’t see this as a 
sufficient reason to prohibit the cloning of animals (Hernes, Stortinget 21.03, 1997: 4). 
As a matter of principle, Arnstad would like to prohibit both human cloning and the 
cloning of animals (Arnstad, Stortinget 21.03, 1997:2), while Hernes would like a more 
nuanced and open-minded discussion of this matter. But as he places man above other 
mammals, he is still implying that a prohibition of human cannot be justified on the same 
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 basis as a prohibition of animal cloning. Humans and animals should be treated 
separately. The legislation should be different with respect to human and animal cloning. 
By saying that a prohibition of cloning should not apply to animals, he is drawing an 
important line between humans and animals. The minister of health uses the term 
‘developed mammals’ to designate humans. As to ethical guidelines, he draws the line 
between the lower and higher animals. But he still finds it difficult to draw an exact line 
and asks if we should ban the production of genetically identical individuals all together, 
whether they be two-legged or four-legged (Hernes, Stortinget 21.03, 1997:3) 
 
I have placed Hernes’ conception of man as the most developed mammal in the same 
category as the religious arguments, because Hernes not only grants man24 with a unique 
position in nature, but also sees man’s inherent value. The rejection of human cloning and 
animal cloning cannot be grounded on the same principles. This implies that man has an 
important responsibility, not just toward nature, but also toward himself and toward other 
people. This answers the religious description of man as having inherent value and 
purpose. 
 
Man’s position in creation is essential to the religious ideal-type conception of the risks 
connected to gene technology. The religious ideal-type position puts man at the head of 
creation, which makes it natural to ask whether the technology used on animals should be 
transferred to humans.  
      
The risks involved in transferring animal experiments to humans 
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 According to Arnstad it is not the sanctity of animals that precludes animal cloning, but 
rather the concern for negative effects that this technology might inflict on the 
environment. As to the arguments in favour of a prohibition of animal cloning, the 
concern is about the possible transfer of this technology from animals to humans. To 
accept this technology would raise ethical dilemmas because it would mean an extension 
of its use. In Arnstad’s opinion there are plenty of reason to ban animal as well as human 
cloning.  
 
One reason is that the method used is the same whether it is being used on animals or on 
humans. The general acceptance of cloning would lead to increased pressure to allow 
human cloning as well. Another issue is that increased use of a certain method leads to 
greater risk of the same method being abused (Arnstad (Centre party) Stortinget 21.03, 
1997:2). 
 
The use of this technology represents a threat to mankind, but what Arnstad is saying can 
be taken to mean that the technology itself is inherently unethical. Accordingly, this 
technology is not ethically neutral, and this makes it impossible to separate the 
technology from its use25. This technology has ethics, which the religious ideal-type also 
suggests. Man represents life, claims the religious view, while gene technology and those 
engaged in genetic science and in developing new techniques of artificial reproduction 
and cloning represent ’the culture of death’ (Caygill, 2000:156). This culture is, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
24 Cf. Being superior to all other animals. 
25 Cf Haraway and Latour and their conception of what counts as human and non-human of this technology. 
These definitions are not universal, self-evident truths. They change according to circumstances (Asdal et 
al., 1998:32). 
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 according to the religious ideal- type, destructive in its nature and works against life 
through its scientific work. Given the sanctity and inviolability of life, the ’opponents’ of 
life are demonised. They represent the opposite of life; destructive forces and that which 
can be violated. The challenge for mankind, as representatives of ’the culture of life’ is to 
maintain a clear conception of what it means to be human and of human rights and duties. 
Human cloning represents a threat to human integrity and identity because this 
technology challenges our preconceived opinions of what it means to be human. 
 
Arnstad points to the fact that scientists do not operate in a vacuum. They are a part of 
society. She questions the use of public money (Stortinget 21.03, 1997:2). Science should 
answer the ethical expectations of the rest of society, and consequently not be carried out 
in a vacuum, without regard for ethics and the effects on society at large (Ibid). 
 
(…) the lack of ethical intuition that is evident in certain scientific 
communities is cause for concern. (…) Even scientists should be able to 
say that we don’t need to know everything. Regardless of the personal 
attitudes of science, society has a right to check the expenditure of public 
money. 
(Arnstad (Centre party), Stortinget 21.03, 1997:2)   
 
Arnstad’s approach to the ethical standards of scientists is typical of the religious ideal- 
type, which looks upon scientists and scientific institutions as representatives of ’the 
culture of death.’ Scientists who want no restraints on their work are a challenge to the 
ethical standards of society. And, as Arnstad points out, there are scientists who warn us 
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 against limiting their freedom. She goes on to say that this argument has always been 
used to stop attempts to check the methods used in gene technology (Ibid). The religious 
ideal-type labels gene technology as the ‘culture of death’. This culture is characterized 
as supporting individual liberty and moral relativism (Caygill, 2000:156). The arguments 
against scrutinizing gene technology and the arguments in favour of free research that are 
a challenge to Arnstad’s views, in that they represent the before mentioned liberal attitude 
among scientists. This liberal attitude is a challenge to society, the way she sees it. The 
challenge consists in protecting society and man against cloning, which is something 
society rejects on ethical grounds, whereas scientists often have a more relativist attitude 
towards it. That is why she wants a broad exchange of opinions on the subject, which, 
ideally, will secure the basis of a very stringent attitude towards cloning (Stortinget 
21.03, 1997:2). This goes against the liberal and relativist attitude, but backs the ideal-
typical religious view of what in means to be human, and of human rights and duties. 
 
Gudmund Hernes, the Minister of Health, shares Arnstad’s concern about the methods 
used on the sheep Dolly. The application of this technique on humans will most likely be 
an option in the near future. With regard to this Hernes asks the question of whether the 
production of genetically identical individuals (be they quadrupeds or bipeds) should be 
prohibited all together. He also asks whether we should limit the freedom of the 
scientists. 
 
Is realizing every possibility we might have, now or in the future, ethically 
sound? What should we, on moral or other grounds, abstain from doing? 
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 Where are we to draw the line between Sacred and expendable life? The 
possibilities are many.  
(Gudmund Hernes (Minister of Health), Stortinget 21.03, 1997:3) 
 
He too describes the worst case scenarios and gives disturbing predictions of the future. 
He emphasizes the point he is making by asking if a cloned person would have a soul 
(Ibid). In spite of the naive phrasing of this question, it is never the less important. It is a 
question that interests the general public. And the implications of this question also 
secure the basis on which to decide which species it is ethical to clone. Asking the 
question of how to delineate the sanctity of life, he is adding a question about body and 
soul. Even if Hernes on the whole shares Arnstad’s concern, he does not presuppose as a 
self-evident truth the sanctity of man’s integrity and identity. He encourages a debate on 
what we see as necessary truths concerning what is sacred and what is not. 
 
Arnstad treats the assumption that human cloning is a threat to mankind as an a priori 
truth. Consequently, to ban human cloning would be the only ethically sound thing to do. 
Hernes does not preclude that exceptions from the general prohibition of animal cloning 
should be made, when it is useful to society to do so (Stortinget, 21.03.,1997:4). Arnstad 
on the other side asks if this is to the good of society or to the good of the vested 
interests. 
 
The question remains; is this about the medicine or about the profit made 
from selling it? The medicines produced with the help of cloning can 
actually be made without cloning, only it would be more expensive.  
(Marit Arnstad (Centre party), Stortinget 21.03, 1997:2) 
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The MP from the Centre Party doubts the intentions of the scientists. She questions their 
motives with regard to science, development and industry. The common good cannot be 
their over all concern. Consequently, the consideration of the common good is not 
enough to justify animal cloning, in Arnstad’s opinion. 
 
Hernes does not automatically draw the conclusion that extended use and testing of a 
technique, in this case cloning, is in itself ethically unsound, because extended use 
increases the risk of the technique being abused, and it increases the pressure to extend 
the use to humans as well. This conclusion is not valid in Hernes’ opinion, nor is it a 
sufficient reason to prohibit animal cloning. He goes on to point out that: 
 
For centuries man has bred other animals – it is a well-known, commonly 
used technique in agriculture, but still it has not been transferred to 
humans. So I am not sure that the concern that animal cloning will 
eventually lead to human cloning is a valid argument in this context. 
(Gudmund Hernes, Stortinget 21.03, 1997:5) 
 
At this point, Arnstad is backed by Frafjord Johnson (Christian Democrats), who 
disagrees with the Minister of Health. Frafjord Johnson thinks that the scientific break-
through, which the cloning of Dolly represents, is very easily transferred to humans 
(Frafjord Johnson (Christian Democrats), Stortinget 21.03, 1997:8). Both the two MP’s 
use the risk of the technology being transferred to humans as an argument against cloning 
in general. Solheim (Socialist Party) shares their view and doubts the validity of Hernes’ 
argument. The MP from the Socialist Party turns to history to find explanations, and says 
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 that history teaches us that technological development makes the technology more 
accessible and easier to use. 
 
Many different techniques have been greatly simplified, and consequently 
they are more commonly used. Against this background, it is important to 
ask the question of how to check the development. 
(Erik Solheim (Socialist Party), Stortinget 21.03., 1997:7)  
 
The reason he gives for wanting to prohibit animal cloning, is that the technique, if 
legalized, will inevitably be made easier to use and more accessible, and consequently 
very easily transferable to humans. As Arnstad he wants Norway to work to have cloning 
banned on an international level. (Stortinget 21.03., 1997:2,8). With view to the 
perspective of change through joint action of the religious ideal type, this is a way for the 
nation to join in a shared political strategy in favour of  ’the culture of life’. 
 
The purpose of cloning 
This debate includes the issues concerning the different methods used in cloning, such as 
cloning on cells, by splitting a fertilized egg and somatic cell nuclear transfer. In Hernes’ 
opinion cloning of cells to help individual is fundamentally different from cloning used 
as a means to produce genetically identical individuals (Hernes, Stortinget 21.03., 
1997:4). 
 
Cloning of human cells as a means to produce new skin for skin-
transplants on fire victims might be an option in the future. The same 
technique might also be an option in bone marrow transplants. In my view 
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 there is a fundamental difference between cloning of cells destined to be 
put back, either in the individual they came from or in closely related 
individual at one hand and cloning used merely to multiply certain 
individuals.  
(Gudmund Hernes, Stortinget 21.03, 1997:4) 
 
Hernes speaks in favour of prohibiting animal cloning, considering the implications it 
might have on the environment and the rest of society. But he still thinks that exceptions 
should be made in cases where cloning would be in the interests of society (Hernes, 
Stortinget 21.03, 1997:3). In the case of human cloning the exceptions should be made in 
cases that are principally important, and not just with regard to the common good of 
society. Cloning of human cells should always be in the best interests of the person 
whose cells are being cloned. The consideration of the common good rests on utilitarian 
thinking. In a utilitarian perspective, cloning should be used if the over-all result is to the 
good of society. According to Thomas Achen, who has conducted a study on the 
relationship between ethics, politics and law in the legislative work concerning biological 
technology and gene technology in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, the concept of the 
common good of society is embraced by all the political parties in Norway. It is also 
being used by politicians who want exceptions to be made from general prohibition 
(Achen, 1997:131-132). This is also the case when ethical problems and risks implied by 
gene technology are discussed. For the most part, exceptions to the general prohibition of 
cloning are justified on the grounds of what is in the best interests of society. In this 
respect Hernes is a spokesman for the widely accepted concept of the common good26. 
                                                          
26 The concept of the common good will not be discussed in this study. I have extracted this notion from the 
work of Thomas Achen. 
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 But with respect to human cloning, he takes a different stand. Human cloning is a matter 
of principal importance, and the consideration of what is useful to society is not enough 
to justify it. The fundamental difference between cloning used as a means to treat 
illnesses and cloning used to make exact copies of existing individuals, lies in the 
fundamentally different intentions with which these two types of cloning are being done. 
The first type of cloning is being done to improve the health of the individual or a close 
relative of that individual. This is not just in the best interests of society, but also in the 
best interests of the person concerned. Man is not to be seen as a merely a means to 
produce cells and organs or in as something to be used for scientific or industrial 
purposes. Man is an end in itself with inherent value. And when the line is drawn at 
cloning used to the benefit of the person whose cells are being cloned, the purpose of 
cloning is that specific person. As the most sophisticated mammal, man has inherent 
value regardless of its utility. When cloning of lower animals is accepted on the basis of 
utility, it shows that rather than granting them with inherent value, their value is based on 
considerations of utility. As I understand what Hernes is saying, the definition of man as 
the highest mammal is due to man’s ability to reach goals that he sets for himself. Man is 
the only creature who possesses free will, and man can decide for himself whether man 
wants this autonomy to be a means to an end or an end in itself. The concept of autonomy 
is therefore inextricably linked to the concept of man’s inherent value. These to notions 
are at the core of the religious ideal-type position. Man is not just a means to an end or 
supplier of raw material, but also an end in itself. This view is often related to Kant and 
the categorical imperative (Kemp, 1991:32), which tells us never to treat people merely 
as means, but always as ends. This answers well with the golden rule of the Bible: 
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 Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to 
them (…) (Mathew 7:12). This is a general principle. Making choices and reaching 
personal goals presupposes autonomy. But to maintain man’s inherent value man has to 
act so as not to violate the autonomy and sanctity of other people. By regarding other 
people merely as a means, these people are deprived of their dignity and their possibility 
to make autonomous decisions. It would contradict the arguments of the religious ideal- 
type position, which the Minister of Health adheres to. 
 
Natural and unnatural reproduction 
Hilde Frafjord Johnsen (Christian Democrats) brings up another issue in the debate, as 
she speaks of the fundamental biological process. What is fundamentally new, she says, 
given the cloning of Dolly, is that the fundamental biological process of reproduction has 
been change, in so far as we can procreate without natural insemination and without the 
coalesce of egg and sperm. 
 
It no longer takes two, one is sufficient. The parentless mammal has 
become a reality, and maybe the parentless human will be one too, if we 
don’t draw the line.  
(Hilde frafjord Johnson (Christian Democrats), Stortinget 21.03, 1997:8) 
 
The Christian faith is based on the belief that man is created by God in God’s image. 
Therefore man has an obligation to realize the purpose of god’s creation. So God created 
man in his own image, in the image of God created him; male and female created he 
them. And God blessed them, and God said unto them: Be fruitful and multiply, and 
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 replenish the earth, and subdue it (…) (1. Book of Genesis 1:27,28). According to 
Genesis the purpose of men and women as God’s creation is to produce descendants and 
be fertile. The technique of cloning makes it possible to produce people independently of 
the fundament of procreation, namely the two sexes, and this goes against the divine 
purpose of creation. The religious argument against reproductive cloning also applies to 
the use of embryos for scientific purposes and the use of inseminated eggs for medical 
purposes. First of all, arguments in favour of the use of cloned embryos for research 
purposes would contend with the religious ideal-type, because one would also have to 
accept the production of inseminated eggs merely for scientific use. This would be 
against ’the culture of life’ because human embryos would be treated as raw material to 
be used in research, i.e. only as a means and not as an end. Secondly one would have to 
accept artificial reproduction without the natural implications that is a coalesce between 
an egg and a sperm. This does not just imply that eggs and sperm meet intest-tubes. 
Given the possibility of cell nuclear transfer reproduction can happen in a way that, in 
Frafjord’s view, defies natural reproduction in that eggs can be inseminated without 
sperm. The nucleus of one cell (taken from either a man or a woman) is simply placed in 
an egg cell that has no nucleus. At this point Hernes points to the fact that this technology 
makes it possible for women to have babies without a man, and he asks the question of 
whether this technology should be made available to lesbian women (Hernes, Stortinget 
21.03, 1997:3). I will not go further into that matter, but I mention it to show some of the 
many implications of the issue of cloning. Anyway the question of natural versus 
artificial reproduction touches upon the issue of lesbian mothers. In their opinion lesbian 
mothers are against the natural, otherwise they would not question whether the 
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 technology should be made available to lesbian women. Hernes and Frafjord Johnson 
bring up the issue of fatherless children, because this form of reproduction rocks the 
foundations of the Christian tradition.  
 
Is knowledge always a blessing? 
The religious ideal-type position is based on Christianity and the Bible. According to the 
book of Genesis man sinned as he defied God and ate the fruit from the tree of 
knowledge.  
 
And the Lord God commanded the man, saying, Of every tree of the garden thou mayest 
freely eat: But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it: for in 
the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die (1. Book of Genesis 2:16-17). After 
the fall of man, telling right from wrong became man’s lot in life. 
 
Throughout the political debate on cloning the question of what we really want to know 
keeps repeating itself. The religious ideal-type position tends to focus on the negative 
aspects of knowledge about our genes. This is recognizable in Arnstad’s concern that 
extended use of this technology will lead to extended abuse of the same technology 
(Stortinget 21.03., 1997:2), and in her view that even scientists should be able to say that 
there are certain types of information that we can do without (Ibid). Hernes touches upon 
the same issue, saying that what is theoretically doable is not always ethically sound 
(Stortinget 21.03., 1997:6). Meltveit Kleppa (Centre Party) refers to statements made by 
scientists, saying that there is information which had better remain unknown, if science is 
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 to comply with Christian and humanist values (Stortinget 21.03., 1997:7). Høegh 
(Conservative Party) agrees with her and says that we should not allow anything that 
technology makes possible (Stortinget 21.03., 1997:7). Solheim (Socialist Party) is more 
explicit and supports the prohibition of animal cloning on the grounds that the 
technological development is way ahead of the ethical discussion on this matter 
(Stortinget 21.03., 1997:8). Frafjord Johnson sees the development as a threat to natural 
reproduction. The fatherless child might become a reality, if we don’t draw the line 
(Ibid). What these statements have in common is that they warn us against knowing more 
than we can handle. Knowledge becomes a curse when it threatens our ethical barriers, 
the unique position of man or our natural reproduction, or when the development gets out 
of hand and the use of the technology becomes impossible to check. Knowledge also 
turns out to be a curse when the consideration of utility overshadows the notion of the 
sanctity of man (Cf. The purpose of cloning). 
 
BRIEF SUMMARY 
Before I continue my analysis, I would like to gather what I have found interesting so far. 
Arnstad, as the interpellant, is the most out-spoken adherent to the religious ideal-type 
position in the debate. But as I have shown all the parties (Labour, the Centre Party, the 
Christian Democrats, the Conservative Party and the Socialist Party) have MP’s who give 
arguments that are partially in conformity with the religious ideal-type position. 
Arnstad’s arguments lend themselves very easily to this interpretation, because she is so 
out-spoken about her negative attitudes towards cloning, and because she bases her 
arguments against cloning on assumptions about the value of humans that she takes to be 
 47 
 
 
 true a priori. In conformity with the religious ideal-type position, Arnstad presupposes the 
sanctity of man as an a priori truth. And she sees cloning as an obvious threat to mankind. 
The arguments of the different MP’s differ in many ways, but still remain within the 
same ideal-type, irrespective of party differences. They have different approaches to the 
same issue. What is interesting to notice is that all the political parties present arguments 
that can be placed under the heading of the religious ideal-type. With view to this one can 
say that the arguments within the religious ideal-type position, crosses the traditional 
political party lines. 
 
3.3 – ARGUMENTS OF THE SCIENTIFIC IDEAL TYPE POSITION 
In this part of the study I will look at the parliamentary discussion of March 7, 1997. This 
interpellation was made by Magnhild Meltveit Kleppa (Centre Party) to the Minister of 
Environmental Matters, Torbjørn Berntsen. Arnstad asked him whether he would take 
measures to secure an independent genetic science that is in the best interests of society 
(Stortinget, 07.03., 1997:1). This interpellation is more specific and more scientific in its 
approach to the issues on the agenda, which are science, research and development, than 
the broad discussion on gene technology of 21.03, 1997. 
 
Old or new technology? 
Arguments that focus on the risk-aspect of gene technology keep recurring in the debate. 
The technology itself, its use and the consequences of that use are matter for concern.  
This insecurity and the fear of gene technology are an underlying force throughout the 
debate. This is due to the fact that the development in gene technology has moved 
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 quicker than anyone had ever imagined (Meltveit Kleppa (Centre Party), Stortinget 
07.03., 1997:1). The Storting has already pointed out that we need legislation on 
biological technology in specific. The Bio-technological Comity27 stated this as a fact in 
1992 (Achen, 1997:131, 132). In other words, it has already been stated that we are 
facing a new kind of technology that demands new legislation on the area. This debate 
was taken up again in 1997, and Meltveit Kleppa raised the question during the 
parliamentary legislative session of March 7 1997. She asks the question of whether the 
ethical issues connected to gene technology receive enough attention in the current 
legislation, and suggests that; in order to fulfil the intentions of the gene technology law 
the issue of cloning requires changes in the legislation (Meltveit Kleppa, Stortinget 
07.03., 1997:1). She asks the question of whether our legislation on this area is adequate 
with view to the ’new’ technology. She thinks that the law on gene- and biotechnology is 
too general in its phrasing, and that what is meant by in a way that is ethically sound and 
in the best interests of society’ should be more clearly defined (Meltveit Kleppa (Centre 
Party), Stortinget 07.03., 1997:2). The concern about the legislation not being specific 
enough is due to the fact that the new technology might give rise to new ethical dilemmas 
and new problems for society and for the environment. 
 
The minister of environmental issues agree with her on the point that this is a 
complicated issue and a complicated area of concern, but he still thinks that the 
politicians manage fairly well (Berntsen, Stortinget 07.03., 1997:5). Holte is explicit on 
the point that biological technology raises new issues, due to the fact that this technology 
                                                          
27 The comity was put together on June 6, 1987. Its main purpose was looking into the environmental and 
security matters concerning the new biotechnology. 
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 makes it possible to produce new organisms that might rock the ecological balance in 
nature (Holte (Centre Party), Stortinget 07.03., 1997:6). He goes on to ask: 
 
Do we really want this development? If the answer is yes: To what extent 
do we want it? And what will be the consequences of this production of 
organisms? 
(Holte (Centre Party), Stortinget 07.03., 1997:6) 
 
He draws on consequence ethics, with respect to which, the fundamental issue is the 
consequences of gene technology. Whether the technology is ethical or not is based on 
the over-all effect on society. The scientific ideal-type sees science and technology as 
ethically neutral. Hence, the ethical dilemmas arise from the consequences of technology 
(Caygill, 2000:159). The scientific ideal-type position differentiates between the 
technology as such and its use. This view stands off from that of the religious ideal-type 
position, which finds it difficult to separate the technology from its use28 (Ibid:156, 157). 
 
Weberg, MP from the Conservative Party emphasizes the need to stay calm and not 
create fear of a science that can greatly serve man (Weberg, Stortinget 07.03., 1997:6,7).  
He wants state comities to take the decisions relating to scientific matters. He thinks this 
will prevent unnecessary anxiety concerning the question of cloning. He thinks that all 
the attention focused on these issues will create pressure to change the existing legislation 
(Ibid). Hence, one might minimize the ethical dilemmas of cloning by introducing new 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
28 The argument is that machines con only be understood in terms of their use, and hence in terms of the 
context in which they are situated (Grint & Woolgar, 1997:13). 
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 laws. And these changes should be made after a scientific assessment based on scientific 
knowledge. 
 
The MP from the Socialist Party, Schaffey, is even more out-spoken concerning the new 
technology: 
 
We are facing an extremely rapid technological development in this area, 
which enables us to manipulate life itself in ever new ways. 
(Paul Schaffey (Socialist Party), Stortinget 07.03., 1997:7) 
 
The new technology represents new areas of use, which, in Schaffey’s view implies new 
ways of manipulating life. His statement answers the arguments of the religious ideal- 
type position, and hence it is no surprise that Schaffey supports the initiative of the 
Christian Democrats to prohibit experimental cloning, regardless of the practice in other 
countries (Ibid). Frafjord Johnson (Christian Democrats) thinks that the intentions of the 
Norwegian legislation should have more practical impact and result in specific guidelines 
for research (Frafjord Johnson (Christian Democrats), Stortinget 07.03., 1997:7). In spite 
of the fact that their arguments might as well be placed under a religious heading, they 
are included under the scientific ideal-type position: They believe that enforced 
legislation will make sure that the biotechnological activity will be consistent with the 
purpose of gene technology (Ibid). This shows that they respect the scientific judgements 
that will underlie the changes in legislation. And changes are necessary because we are 
dealing with a new technology with new ethical implications. 
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 Gjul, the MP from Labour has this to say about the new technology: 
 
What the most of us have in common is that we know too little about gene 
technology to know the consequences and implications of it. In many 
cases not even the scientists are aware of the ecological and environmental 
consequences. In many cases they solve one problem, but produce new 
and unexpected problems in the process. 
(Gunn Karin Gjul (Labour), Stortinget 07.03., 1997:9) 
 
In this respect, the threat to human life that gene technology represents is understood as 
the risk that new and unpredicted problems will arise in the wake of the new technology, 
because we have inadequate knowledge about the implications of this technology. This is 
what the scientific ideal-type position sees as the most dangerous aspect of the new 
technology. 
 
A precautionary attitude 
The debate is focused around a national strategy or a more international course of action 
in order to influence the outside world with respect to ethical guidelines. The politicians 
encourage reflection on the issue of ethical barriers, but they also encourage a cautious 
attitude, remembering the locution better safe than sorry, or the precautionary principle, 
towards the technology. This attitude is based on the possible unpredicted, negative 
effects of gene technology (Debate organized by Apollon, 20.04.01, UiO). In this respect, 
the ’better safe than sorry-attitude’ and the precautionary principle is linked to 
consequentialist thinking (Achen, 1997:138). In other words this means that ethical 
guidelines are to be made on the basis of the consequences a specific action might have. 
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 The scientific ideal-type position finds the challenge of science to be finding a way of 
maximizing the advantages of gene technology while minimizing the damages. This 
implies that the good and bad effects of gene technology are to be weighed against each 
other. To be able to maximize the advantages while minimizing the damages, according 
to the scientific ideal-type, the assessment of advantages and damages has to be based on 
critical argumentation and the knowledge of the expertise (Caygill, 2000:159). In the 
view of the people of Europe, the negative impacts of gene technology are ecological 
imbalance, less biological diversity and the spreading of diseases (Nature, Vol 387:845-
847,26.06.1997. 
 
The debate is about whether Norway should approve products that are approved abroad, 
and whether the country should prohibit experiments involving cloning, regardless of 
what is done in other countries (Paul Chaffey (Socialist Party), Stortinget 07.03, 1997:). 
It will be a debate on the question of whether Norway should stick to the precautionary 
principle, ’better safe than sorry-attitude’, and not be influenced by the policies in other 
countries. A national strategy would marginalize Norway as an active part-taker in laying 
the premises for the use and scientific development of bio-technology (Hornslien 
(Labour), Stortinget 07.03., 1997:8). On the other hand voices are raised in favour of a 
national strategy on the grounds that a national strategy will put the need for ethical 
guidelines on the agenda. Our restrictive policy will set an example for other countries. 
(Inga Kvalbukt (Centre Party), Stortinget 07.03, 1997:9): 
 
In the context of the debate on cloning we will play the part warning bell. 
Our practice and our rules might be an example to others. With or without 
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 the support of international forum, it still makes a difference that at least 
someone is in the right here! 
(Ibid) 
 
The subject of the political discourse is the question of whether, in the attempt to prevent 
guidelines that are too liberal, with the risks that would imply for our future. The debate 
goes in favour of a cautious attitude whether the effort to continue a stringent policy is on 
a national or international level. The precautionary principle is generally embraced by the 
politicians, because, as Gjul (Conservative Party) points out, we lack knowledge about 
this technology and its consequences (Stortinget 07.03., 1997:9). 
 
The term ’the culture of ignorance’ is part of the terminology of the scientific ideal-type 
position. According to which the greatest threat to man is ignorance and insufficient 
information and knowledge (Caygill, 2000:158). Like the rest of the MP’s, Meltveit 
Kleppa focuses on the possible negative consequences that GMO and the development in 
gene technology might have on mankind and the environment. ’The culture of ignorance’ 
represents the extreme positions in the discussion, those who support gene technology 
and those who oppose gene technology. What they have in common is that both stands 
base their views on uncritical argumentation. This represents a risk in itself according to 
the scientific ideal-type. The focus on the negative consequences of gene technology is 
not necessarily caused by massive objection to biotechnology among politicians, but can 
also be seen as a sign of fear and insecurity about the consequences and development of 
gene technology. This insecurity is compensated for by asking, what will be the possible 
future consequences of gene technology. The perspective of risk and the focus on ethical 
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 challenges represent critical argumentation, so a debate on those terms is not ignorant. 
The debate is inherently critical because it asks questions and is aware of the ethical 
problems, and it does not automatically approve of scientific practices. Meltveit Kleppa is 
asking whether we know enough to evaluate the risks implied by gene technology, and 
she is asking about the ethical standards that underlie biotechnology (Stortinget 07.03, 
1997:1-2). These are critical questions.  
 
Meltveit Kleppa refers to the respective statements of Blix Gundersen, a professor 
attached to the Bio-technological Comity and of another professor of the institute of 
medical biology in Tromsø (Stortinget 07.03, 1997:2). According to Meltveit Kleppa, the 
two experts have divergent views on the long-term effects of gene technology. In 
Meltveits argumentation, the first professor represents a person without reservations 
against the use of certain genetically modified products. Meltveit Kleppa refers to a 
statement made by Blix Gundersen in which supports the cultivation of gene raps29. She 
goes on to say that she is not worried about the development and use of these products 
will be detrimental to humans or to the environment. 
 
I am not reassured by Blix Gundersen who, like so many other scientists, 
uses the word ’believe’, instead of the word ’know’ in contests where it is 
imperative to know the probability of an event occurring, and then multiply 
that event by the consequences of the said event. 
(Magnhild Meltveit Kleppa (Centre Party), Stortinget 07.03, 1997:2) 
 
                                                          
29 An oil-plant. 
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 Meltveit Kleppa speaks in favour of a more restrictive legislation than what the scientist 
in the Bio-technological Comity wants. In Kleppa’s opinion, believing is not enough, 
especially when the matter at hand is something very important, like gene technology. 
The challenge for the scientific ideal type strategy is to obtain the scientific knowledge 
that is necessary to be able to predict the consequences and future hazards of this 
technology. Meltveit hints to this solution, i.e. ’knowing,’ in stead of ’believing.’ 
According to the scientific arguments the fact that it is impossible to predict all the 
consequences of an event, represents a threat (Caygill, 2000:158-159). And she shows 
her doubt and lack of confidence in the scientists’ ability to ’know’. Blix Gundersen is 
not the only scientist who ’believes’, according to Meltveit Kleppa. The researcher has to 
believe, simply because absolute knowledge of the future is impossible. Since our 
knowledge is insufficient, this insufficiency should be compensated by stringent rules and 
concrete guidelines. She thinks the legislation should be a step a head of the 
development, and asks if there is more than can be done to comply with the cautiousness-
principle within the existing legislation (Meltveit Kleppa, Stortinget 07.03, 1997:2). She 
is supported by Holte, another MP from the Centre Party, who thinks that the people who 
initiates this critical debate on the need for a more cautious science, should be applauded 
(Ibid:6). 
 
According to the scientific ideal type, the goal of science is progress, in this case to 
maximize the advantages of genetic modification, and minimize the damages. Meltveit 
Kleppa clearly does not trust that the scientists know enough to ’know’ about the 
negative consequences and risks implied by gene technology (Stortinget 07.03, 1997:2) 
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 The scientific ideal-type sees insufficient knowledge as a major threat to mankind, and in 
this view her statement is clearly within the limits of the scientific ideal-type. The other 
MP’s are also speaking in favour for the precautionary principle, because, as they say 
more or less clearly, we cannot achieve absolute knowledge about the results. This 
argument is within the scientific ideal-type.  
 
Dependent and independent research 
The other expert opinion that Meltveit Kleppa refers to is typical, in her opinion, of a 
more sceptical attitude towards gene technology and genetically modified products. For 
the most part, Meltveit Kleppa shares the views of the professor, i.e. that the people 
involved in the development and production of genetic material are incapable of 
assessing the damaging effects that their activity might have (Stortinget 07.03, 1997:2). 
Research units that do not rely on support from the vested interests or from various 
interest groups, would be better equipped to assess these damages, the professor says. So 
far Meltveit Kleppa agrees with him, and she adds a remark on the importance of 
encouraging critical voices and independent research (Ibid). She supports a political 
strategy and a research program, which by means of its critical attitude and independence 
will be a safeguard against ignorance and indifference. The alternative research units, or 
independent scientific communities, should have increased knowledge as their 
motivation: Because knowledge is an end in itself. In other words, the development of 
specific products or assignments given to them by private enterprise should not be the 
driving force behind their work. In stead their source of motivation should be obtaining 
knowledge and inn-sight that can serve the needs of society. This implies a wish for a 
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 science that serves the interests of society, with the intention to accumulate information 
and conduct research that is neutral, objective and critical. According to the scientific 
ideal-type, biotechnology and genetic modification are ethically neutral entities. But even 
so, the challenge is to the scientific ideal-type that their neutrality is threatened by new 
ethical dilemmas that arise in the wake of the technological development and its practical 
implication (Caygill, 2000:158-159). What Meltveit Kleppa and the professor she refers 
to seam to be speaking in favour of is to restore the ethical neutrality of science by 
establishing independent, critical research that serves the long term interests of society. 
This research is supposed to be as neutral as possible, and to have no motivation, but 
what is in the best interests of society, namely better inn-sight and more knowledge. 
 
We have to keep in mind that Meltveit Kleppa does not claim that the technology as such 
is ethically neutral. But she sees the establishment of independent research as a means to 
focus on the consequences of the use and abuse of biotechnology. Speaking in favour of a 
neutral, but critical research, she directs our attention to the existing research which is not 
critical enough, and which is controlled by other interests, than the ‘purely’ scientific 
ones. The challenge for the scientific ideal type is to fight ignorance. And at this point 
Meltveit is clear as to what she wants: to establish a critical and independent research. 
 
The main issue of this debate is how to secure a genetic science that is true to important 
ethical standards, and what measures to take to secure the fulfilment of the intentions of 
the law on gene technology. Dependent research is based on assignments from investors 
who in turn want to make a profit. Independent research should as a matter of principle 
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 be independent of product-developing, and Norwegian bio-technological research is for 
the most part financed by the state. To a greater extent than what is the case in Norway, 
the research conducted USA, Japan, Canada and the European Union is directed by 
commercial interests, and is financed by the industry. Thorbjørn Berntsen, Minister of 
environmental matters, claims that these countries have set a standard for research and 
development in the rest of the world. But given the fact that Norwegian research, for the 
most part, depends on public funding, Norway has a unique possibility to control the 
commercial development based on gene technology (Stortinget 07.03, 1997:4). Norway 
is therefore in the position to control research and make sure that the products that are 
developed are useful and not damaging to the environment (Ibid). He goes on to say that 
in the case of basic research the practical utility is yet unknown, and hence it is up to the 
scientists themselves to decide what is ethically acceptable. This is a big responsibility 
for the scientists. When scientific discoveries are put the use, it raises ethical issues, and 
at this stage it is possible to demand that the scientists live up to ethical standards, and 
that their works are useful to the public (Torbjørn Berntsen, Stortinget 07.03, 1997:3). 
The existence of independent research communities with a special interest in ethical 
questions concerning biotechnology is therefore very important in Berntsen’s opinion 
(Ibid). 
 
Holte, MP from the Centre Party, agrees with him for the most part, but he explains the 
need for independent research by pointing to the needs of the consumers: 
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 The development clearly shows that we need expertise that can give a 
straight answer on the question of whether the genetically modified 
products are as harmless as the producer claim they are. 
(Holte (Centre Party), Stortinget 07.03., 1997:6) 
 
His statement shows the great confidence he has in this independent expertise, which will 
give truthful answers about the products based on gene technology. Weberg 
(Conservative Party) is clearly very confident in expert opinions, and supports ethical 
quality testing in biotechnological research. But he stresses the point that advice and 
recommendations should be based on scientific assessments (Stortinget 07.03., 1997:7). 
The Christian Democrats take it even further and make the same as proposition as they 
did during the discussions on the law on gene technology. They are not satisfied by the 
establishment of an independent research unit concerned with ethical questions, they 
want this unit to be in charge of approving or rejecting scientific work (Frafjord Johnson 
(Christian Democrats), Ibid:8). The Labour MP is clear at this point: 
 
We need independent research oriented towards the needs of society. 
We need research institutions run by the state – i.e. independent of 
commercial interests – which conduct their work with view to the long 
term effects of genetic modification. 
(Gunn Marit Gjul (Labour), Stortinget 07.03., 1997:9) 
 
According to the scientific ideal type position, the threat to human life that gene 
technology represents is related to the long term effects and side effects of the 
technology. This insecurity concerning the future is compensated for by putting 
independent research on the political agenda. 
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Use and abuse of the technology 
The insecurity that is perceivable in the debate is due to the fact that the technological 
development has been greater than anyone could have imagined, but it is also due to the 
fact that the politicians are laymen and lack the qualifications of scientists. There is a 
concern that the scientists are too far ahead of the current, inadequate legislation. There 
maybe loop holes in the legislation, which the scientists can use to their own advantage, 
if they are more concerned about profit than about ethics. Another cause for concern is 
the fact that no matter how adequate our legislation becomes; the possibility of abuse will 
still exist. In March 1997 the Centre Party raised the issue of whether Norway has the 
necessary means to secure the fulfilment of the intentions of the paragraph concerning the 
law on gene- and biotechnology (Meltveit Kleppa (Centre Party), Stortinget 07.03, 
1997:1). The Centre party thinks that the law is not specific enough and questions the 
utility of it. As the law says nothing about the use of naked DNA, a heavy burden is laid 
on the scientists, in that they themselves have to make sure that they stay within the 
boundaries of what is ethically acceptable (Ibid:2). The fact that the ethical responsibility 
is put on the individual scientists represents a possibility of abuse. 
 
The law on gene technology does not regulate the use of naked DNA. 
There do not exist any rules on how the laboratories are to deal with DNA. 
This is the case in Norway as well as abroad. It is of fundamental 
importance to be cautious in this matter. 
(Magnhild Meltveit Kleppa, Stortinget 07.03., 1997:2,3) 
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 The ethical dilemmas that arise in the wake of gene technology are, according to the 
scientific ideal type perspective related to the eventual abuse of the technology. The 
legislators have to take the possibility of abuse into consideration. The question of use 
versus abuse arises many of the arguments raised in favour of the precautionary principle. 
The threat, the way the politicians see it, is that not even the scientists can predict the 
implications of the new technology on society and on the environment (Gjul (Labour), 
Stortinget 07.03., 1997:9). Berntsen is of the same opinion, and adds that the scientists 
have a personal responsibility to stay within the ethical boundaries (Berntsen, Stortinget 
07.03., 1997:3). Technology can therefore no longer be considered ethically neutral, 
because the technology might be abused. The possibility of abuse is a challenge to the 
view of the scientific ideal type, i.e. that the technology is ethically neutral. The religious 
ideal-type position has the opposite view, that the technology, which cannot be separated 
from its use, can neither be separated from morals and values. Hence, the religious ideal-
type is closer to the view that risks and ethical issues are inherent to the new technology. 
 
Information, research and lay people 
The arguments that belong in the category of the scientific ideal-type stress the 
importance of knowledge and expertise. The compensation for the insecurity regarding 
the technology is, according to the scientific ideal-type, trying to keep the technology 
ethically neutral. The benefits of scientific knowledge should be seen in terms of their 
ethical value rather than in terms of their commercial value. And information should 
inform rather than spread anxiety among the public (Stortinget 07.03., 1997:3,4). This 
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 argument is based on that right information might compensate for the threat and anxiety 
among the public. 
 
The ethical value referred to in the above is the benefit of protecting the environment and 
the ecological balance and of respecting ethical boundaries and the law. This is a great 
contrast to the commercial value. The patent directive of the EU is important in this 
context. This directive says Jørgen Holte from the Centre Party makes it possible to 
patent microorganisms. The directive gives a broad definition of the term ’micro-
organisms’. This broad definition may result in a situation where nearly all bio-
technological products are patented (Stortinget Friday 07.03, 1997:7). He is concerned 
about the position of the United States, and the trajectory of the Great Power may 
influence Europe and Japan with respect to the regulation of gene technology. What he 
seems to be most concerned about is that, with regard to science and technology that the 
normative boundaries are given less priority compared to the commercial interests. 
 
The establishment of a body of independent experts is to give advice and 
recommendations with respect to legislation and ethical guidelines concerning the use 
and development of gene technology. This strategy, whether national or international, 
should put the problems related to cloning on the agenda. At the moment, the arguments 
that are prevalent throughout the debate are arguments characterized by scepticism and 
distrust with respect to cloning and lack of confidence in the scientists and their 
knowledge. 
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 I don’t think we can solve all these issues on a national scale. We need 
joint action on an international scale to counteract the powerful forces we 
are up against.  
(Hornslien (Labour), Stortinget 07.03, 1997:8) 
 
Inga Kvalbukt from the Centre Party shares the scepticism of Labour MP, but the Centre 
Party is in favour of a national political strategy. She is explicit about her lack of 
confidence, and says that the politicians have a responsibility to inform the public and 
answer the questions that people might ask. 
 
Who are we to trust? It is obvious that the technological possibilities are 
much greater than the knowledge about the consequences of the 
technology. The scientists are like the little boy who sits on the floor 
dismantling a watch, without being capable of putting it together again  
(Kvalbukt (Centre Party), Stortinget 07.03, 1997:8). 
 
The politicians emphasize the power of the researchers and the influential bio-
technological companies, which, to the dislike of the politicians, receive financial support 
from the industry. The technological development of the future and the impact of the new 
technology on future generations depend on the scientists and the biotechnological 
institutions and their ethical and moral foundation. The advantage that Norway has, as 
compared to the USA and the EU, is that Norway has scientific units working with 
ethical and biotechnological problems, that are independent of the commercial interests 
for financial support (Breimo (Labour), Parliament 07.03., 1997:10). Breimo goes on to 
say that this gives Norway an advantage when it comes to orienting research towards 
sustainable products that serve the public. The politicians argue with view to public 
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 opinion and the need for public support. Public opinion has a great influence on the 
market, and products that are supported by the lay public have a greater potential in the 
market. The objective of the parliamentary debate is to avoid consumer scepticism and to 
establish an independent and environmentally sustainable research in this field. These 
arguments are founded upon belief in the beneficent exchange of information between the 
lay public and the expertise. According to the scientific ideal type position, the ’culture of 
ignorance’, which produces both uncritical support and uncritical rejection of 
biotechnology based on insufficient knowledge about gene technology, represents the 
greatest risk related to biotechnology. The politicians share this fear of ignorance. A 
public that lack knowledge about the biotechnological products is not able to support or 
reject biotechnology and its products on rational grounds (Berntsen, Stortinget 07.03., 
1997:4). By providing the public with reliable and objective information, the bio-
technological products would have a greater potential in the market place. The strategy 
consists in fighting ignorance and establishing a fruitful exchange of information between 
the professional expertise and the lay public. This is consistent with the scientific ideal- 
type position, which emphasizes the importance of giving the public information that is 
founded on scientific and professional facts (Caygill, 2000:159). 
 
BRIEF SUMMARY 
Interestingly enough, the politicians use arguments that belong to category of the 
scientific ideal-type in the parliamentary debate of 07.03. 1997. It may not come as a 
surprise, view to the fact science, research and development are on the agenda. But even 
so the argument might as well have been representative of the religious or aesthetic ideal- 
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 type position. As the arguments of the scientific ideal type position are predominant in 
this context, I take it as a sign that the politicians have a conception of science that is in 
conformity with the scientific ideal-type position. It is also interesting to note that the 
scientific ideal-type, as well as the religious ideal-type, overlaps the traditional party 
lines. All the parties represented in the debate, the Centre Party, Labour, the Conservative 
Party, the Socialist Party and the Christian Democrats give arguments concerning science 
and the precautionary principle that are partially representative of the scientific ideal- 
type. The debate of 21.03.1997 produced arguments that were easily associated to the 
religious ideal-type position. The debate of 07.03 produced arguments in conformity with 
the scientific ideal-type position. 
 
3.4 – AESTHETIC IDEAL TYPE ARGUMENTS 
The extreme aesthetic ideal-type position is of course not clearly recognizable in the 
debate on cloning. This position is far too extreme, and it goes against the widespread 
belief that human beings have inherent value and dignity, and should not be reduced to 
objects of technological manipulation. In Norway the legislation30 concerning gene 
technology has been based on the before mentioned precautionary principle (Hviid 
Nielsen, 2000:236) and the principle of Human Rights (Ibid:275). Hence, I do not expect 
to find arguments in the political debate that can be obviously placed under the heading 
of the aesthetic ideal-type position. From the point of view of the aesthetic ideal-type 
position, we run a greater risk if we pass up the opportunities that biotechnology gives us. 
The aesthetic ideal-type draws attention to threat as not using the technological 
                                                          
30 http://www.bion.no/html/genteknologiloven.html 
The gene technology law. 
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 possibilities. I think the aesthetic view can be used to explain a kind of technicism. 
Technicism, or technological determinism, portrays technology with an exogenous and 
autonomous development, which coerces and determines social relationships (Grint et.al., 
1997:11). 
 
The aesthetic ideal-type position takes a very optimistic view of the opportunities that 
technological progress presents to us. Conversely, what we should be worried about, 
according to this view, is consequences of not using the technology will be. The 
deterministic view that we have no choice in the matter is based on the view I referred to 
as ’technicism’ and secondly this optimistic view of technology. The determinism implies 
that we have to realize every technological possibility. The real reason for concern is the 
possibilities that pass us by if we abstain from exploiting the technology. This is a 
deterministic imperative in so far as it preaches the endless striving for knowledge and 
the realization every technological possibility. The technological development has to take 
its course. This deterministic view implies that man is controlled by the technology, 
which unlike man is autonomous (Law et al.). In this sense man has no real choice and 
has to be a part of the technological development whether the man likes it or not. In 
contrast to the religious position, which postulates man’s autonomy as a given, the 
aesthetic deterministic places autonomy with the technology. 
 
The aesthetic ideal type position is not easily recognizable in the Norwegian political 
debate on cloning. The prevalent view among all the politicians is, as I have pointed out 
in the analysis of the scientific and the religious ideal-type position, is that we need to 
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 control and check the development. The political process that resulted in the law on 
biotechnology used for medical purposes (Cf. Innst.O.nr.25 (2000-2001) and Ot.prp.nr.93 
(1998-1999)) indicated that the politicians are very much in favour of regulating gene 
technology in accordance to the principle of sustainable development and the principle of 
man’s inherent value and human rights. The predominant desire among the politicians the 
desire to control the technology, rather than let the technology control us. With view to 
this I have chosen not to give an exhaustive analysis of the aesthetic ideal-type position. 
 
There is of course a political desire to be a part of the technological development, but 
only on the condition that the development is in conformity with the Christian and 
humanist norms that our ethics are based on. Biotechnology represents great 
opportunities, but the politicians stress the point that this research field has to be 
regulated. According to Øyangen (Labour), the Liberal People’s Party seem to have a 
strong faith in the scientists (Stortinget 30.11., 2000:3). This party, through the 
instrument of Jon Alvheim, was the only party that opposed the prohibition of cloning 
used as means to produce identical individuals (Stortinget 32.02., 1998:1). Their 
proposition goes in favour of a less stringent legislation that what the other parties want 
(Cf. Ibid). 
 
Weberg  (Concervative Party) recognizes the need to secure the quality of research 
(Stortinget 07.03., 1997.6), but adds that we have to: 
 
(…) prevent hysteria concerning a form of research that greatly serves 
man as it is today. 
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 (Weberg (Conservative Party), Stortinget 07.03., 1997:6,7) 
 
Meltveit Kleppa supports the conclusions that were drawn on the basis of the 
parliamentary report, i.e. St.meld.nr.36 (1990-1991), which says: 
 
The main view of the government is that we should stimulate the use of 
the new biotechnology as long as the use is in the best interests of society 
and based on the values that make up the foundation of our society, and 
does not represent a threat to people’s health, the ecological balance or our 
environment. 
(Meltveit Kleppa (Centre Party), Stortinget 07.03., 1997:4) 
 
This is not specific about human cloning, but shows the general tendency that the 
Storting also wants to stimulate the development of gene technology, with the reserve 
that it should be subordinated to overruling ethical standards. 
 
The politicians are very much aware of the many positive aspects of gene technology. 
But the desire to control the technology, and to keep it within ethical boundaries, is still 
predominant in the debate. The issues on the agenda indicate that the politicians see the 
need for new laws on this area (Cf. The parliamentary debate of 21.03.1997) and the need 
for research that is beneficent to society (Cf. The parliamentary debate of 07.03.1997). 
 
3.5 – SUMMARY – TECHNOLOGICAL DETERMINISM 
To the extent that an approach to the issue of cloning based on technological determinism 
is traceable in the debate, this technological determinism is of another kind then the 
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 unshakable faith in the technology. The technological determinism that appears in the 
political debate is on another level, and as the professor in political science, Langdon 
Winner, points out is tied to ability of the politicians to neutralize the technology31. 
Winner’s contribution points out the existence of a policy relating specific to artefacts. It 
is not necessarily true that our choices are independent of the policies that are inscribed 
into the technology (Winner, 1986). The main purpose of this analysis has not been to 
find traces of technological determinism among politicians. I mention the concept of 
technological determinism simply because I want to avoid a conception of the political 
agenda that is too categorical at this point, i.e. that it is void of technological 
determinism. I will return to this point in chapter 4. 
 
In terms of the technicism that is characteristic of the aesthetic ideal-type position man is 
predestined to follow up on every technological possibility, regardless of what the man 
ought to do and wants to do. This is a clear contrast to the scientific ideal point position, 
which focuses on control and regulation in order to minimize the damaging effects it may 
have. As I have tried to point out in my analysis the view that we should control 
technology is prevailing among the politicians. The religious ideal-type position is the 
one with the clearest stand against cloning, because the technique of cloning is a threat to 
the religious conception of man. The scientific ideal-type position, justify its opposition 
to cloning on the basis of the impossibility of predicting the effects that this technique 
will have. Both the religious and the scientific ideal-type position are opposed to cloning 
                                                          
31 This is close to Winner’s definition of the term ’autonomous technology’: politics become inscribed in 
technology in such a way that the technology appears neutral (Grint & Woolgar, 1997:13). Winner’s work 
makes us aware of the fact that technology is inextricably linked to politics. This goes, I think, against 
technological determinism, and is in my opinion an attention to open the black box of technology. 
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 but they base their opposition on different grounds. But opposition to human cloning 
remains a shared platform for the religious and the scientific ideal-type position. I will 
return to this shared platform in chapter 4 under the heading: ’The political platform’. 
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 CHAPTER 4 – THE RESULTS AND THE LEGISLATION 
What was the actual outcome of the political debate on cloning, and what new laws did it 
result in? In this chapter I will try to analyse the results, as I try to indicate a common 
political platform crossing the ideal-types. 
 
4.1 – PROHIBITING PRODUCTION OF GENETICALLY IDENTICAL 
INDIVIDUALS 
The issue of the debate in the Odelsting of February 23, 1998 (after the interpellation of 
March 1997 which proposed changes in the law on biotechnology used for medical 
purposes (Innst.O.nr.22 (1997-1998), Cf.Ot.prp.nr.21) was whether techniques, which are 
used to produce genetically identical individuals should be prohibited. The debate was 
instigated by the Christian Democrats who made the proposition to ban all cloning of 
animals and higher organisms. The arguments that Frafjord Johnson (the Christian 
Democrat) uses to support the proposition are quite clear: 
 
It is not in our place, as people, to create new animals or to produce 
identical animals in laboratories.  
(Hilde frafjord Johnson (the Christian Democrats), Stortinget 07.03.1997)  
 
The law, the vote and the result of the vote 
The arguments of the religious ideal-type position manifest a strong wish for stringent 
laws that prohibit both human and animal cloning. Arnstad is more explicit about this 
than Hernes. But like Arnstad he is completely against cloning being used to manufacture 
genetically identical individuals (Hernes, Stortinget 21.03, 1997:9). The current 
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 legislation is inadequate with respect to the technology development. It has not kept up 
with the technological development, he thinks, because it rests on the traditional 
definition of insemination. Cloning does not rest on the natural synthesis of egg and 
sperm, whereas the new technology makes it possible to produce a new individual using 
only one female cell nucleus, which is inserted into an egg, i.e. without the use of sperm 
cells. The law does not apply to this form of reproduction, and Hernes wants legislation 
that contains unambiguous prohibition of reproductive cloning. Frafjord Johnson wants 
our legislation on this area to be as stringent as possible, i.e. to prohibit both animal and 
human cloning. On March 7, 1997, the same proposition, which Frafjord Johnson made 
on behalf of her party, was subjected to parliamentary vote. 
 
Parliament asks the government to propose changes to the law on gene 
technology, in order to prohibit cloning of animals and higher organisms. 
(Vote on the first issue on the agenda32, 07.03.1997). 
 
With the exception of two votes, all the votes were in favour of the proposition (Ibid), 
and it was Anders Hornslien (Labour) who asked Frafjord Johnson to pass the 
proposition on to the Biotechnological Comity. Labour finds it difficult to deal with such 
a complicated issue in an off-hand way (Hornslien (Labour), Stortinget 07.03.1997, vote 
on the first issue on the agenda). The first issue was not passed on to the comity, so 
Hornslien recommended that the Labour MP’s vote against it. The vote itself was based 
on party lines and political tactics rather than on principles of ethics. The vote is not 
necessarily representative of the moral foundation of the respective parties. February 23, 
                                                          
32 Votering i sak nr.1, Stortinget 07.03.1997. 
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 1998, the Storting continued the debate, with view to the eventual prohibition of 
reproductive cloning in the Odelsting, and the parliamentary comity on social issues 
recommended changes in the law on biotechnology used for medical purposes (Innst. 
O.nr.22 (1997-1998), Cf. Ot.prp.nr 21 (1997-1998)). 
 
The proposed changes of 1998 were a continuation of the debate in 1997 on reproductive 
cloning. The bill containing the amendments to the said law, which was originally passed 
August 5, 1994 and said: The use of specific techniques in the purpose of producing 
genetically identical individuals is prohibited (cf. number 56, on biotechnology). The 
new law on biotechnology used for medical purposes was passed February 23, 1998.  
§3a-1 had been amended, and was now saying: Prohibition against use of techniques with 
purpose of producing genetically identical individuals. The use of specific techniques in 
the purpose of producing genetically identical individuals is prohibited (Besl.O.nr.27 
(1997-1998)). In connection to this John I. Alvheim made a proposition on behalf of the 
Liberal People’s Party, which only included the prohibition of reproductive cloning 
effected by cell nuclear transfer (Odelstinget 23.02, 1998:1). In other words, Alvheim 
wants to allow cloning brought about by splitting inseminated eggs, on the condition that 
the method is used only in connection to in vitro fertilization. He justifies his standpoint 
by pointing to the fact that artificial insemination is legal. And as long as it is legal, we 
should be allowed to use the methods that show the best results (Alvheim (the Liberal 
People’s Party), Odelstinget 23.02, 1998:4). He acknowledges no fundamental difference 
between artificial and natural splitting of eggs, and says: 
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 The splitting of inseminated eggs in connection to in vitro fertilization is 
no different from what nature herself does when identical twins are being 
made. 
(John I Alvheim (the Liberal People’s Party), Odelstinget 21,03, 1998:4) 
 
The result of the two phenomena, i.e. natural or artificial egg splitting, is inevitably the 
same, i.e. genetically identical individuals. From Alvheim’s point of view there is no 
difference between letting nature take its course and effectuate the same result in a 
laboratory. But he wants reproductive cloning to be limited to the cases where there is a 
medical justification for helping couples with a strong wish to have children that are 
theirs genetically. If artificial splitting of inseminated eggs is legalized, couples can have 
children that are genetically identical. But the Ministry of Health (which was instigated 
by the Comity on Social Issues to propose changes to the said law) could find no 
sufficient reason to allow the production of genetically identical individuals 
(Innst.O.nr.22 (1997-1998)). The Ministry of Health finds, as did Hernes, that there is a 
fundamental difference between the cloning of genes and cells taken from individuals 
with the intention to put the cells back in the same individuals or in a close relative of the 
individual whose cells are cloned, and cloning used as a means to produce individuals 
that are genetically identical. As to non-reproductive cloning, the Ministry of Health did 
not find sufficient reasons to regulate this sort of activity (Innst.O.nr.22 (1997-1998)). 
The Liberal People’s Party was the only party to make an alternative proposition, which 
was not supported by the majority. Their proposition is not representative of the debate, 
and the Liberal People’s Party did not participate in the debates previous to the 
proposition that Alvheim made. 
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4.2 – A SHARED POLITICAL PLATFORM 
There are of course issues that the politicians discuss that I have not included in my 
analysis. Under the heading ’A shared political platform’, I will focus on aspects of the 
debate that can be said to be characteristic of both the scientific and the religious way of 
argumentation, in as much as the shared political platform is opposition to cloning. The 
most commonly used method to analyse the political field might be to analyse it in terms 
of political party lines. I will try to show that the political laboratory15, as the Storting 
might be in important ways, can represent a shared political platform. A platform of 
shared standpoints and shared opinions. The interesting thing about the debate on cloning 
is that in a political forum it turns into a debate on values. And what the politicians have 
in common might be just as interesting as their internal differences. The shared 
standpoint is evident from the fact that the politicians focus on the problems related to 
cloning. And all the politicians want ethical standards to overrule other considerations 
when regulating biotechnological activities. The shared political platform is also 
characterized by the absence the technicism (technological determinism) that is typical of 
the aesthetic ideal-type position, which is consistent with the focus on problems that is 
characteristic of the political agenda. Even if the arguments of the scientific ideal type are 
                                                          
15 Cf. Karin Knorr-Cetina and laboratory studies. She says that the study of laboratories has brought to the 
fore the full spectrum of activities in the production of knowledge (Knorr-Cetina, 1995:143). Looking into 
the political debate on cloning is in this sense a sort of direct observation and analysis of the political 
discourse at its root, where directions and legislation are produced. 
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 different from the arguments of the religious ideal type, the two positions still end up 
with the same unconditional ‘no’ to human cloning. (Cf. § 3a-1 in the law on 
biotechnology used for medical purposes, cf. Besl. O. Nr.27 (1997-1998)). Can the 
shared political platform explain the stringent legislation? 
 
The optimistic faith in technology as a driving force, which can be of a more or less 
deterministic character, is linked to the unconditional faith in technology that is 
characteristic of the ideal-type position, according to which the development and 
exploitation of technology is the main concern. The perspective of technological 
determinism raises the question of whether we are really in control of the technology. 
Lack of control represents a threat, not just to the aesthetic culture, but also to the 
scientific and the religious culture. To the culture of the aesthetic ideal-type lack of 
control will mean a threat to that culture’s ambition to control and realize the full 
potential of the technology, the goal of this culture being a ’Gesamtkunstwerk’. To the 
scientific ideal-typical culture lack of control will mean insufficient knowledge and 
uncritical use of the technology.  Uncritical and immature use of the technology 
represents a threat, because it is difficult to predict the consequences of such use. To the 
religious ideal-type lack of control implies that the technology controls us, and this means 
that we betray our ideals of human value and human autonomy. Man is no longer a free 
actor and does not fulfil the duty as a human being, as man is no longer in charge of the 
technology. The politicians on the other hand speak in favour of controlling the 
biotechnological development through stringent legislation and strategic research 
programs. In this respect the shared political platform, as opposed to the aesthetic ideal 
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 type, has freed itself from this kind of technological determinism that deprives man of 
control. The politicians want the technological development to be consistent with the 
principle of sustainable development and our national Christian and humanist cultural 
legacy (Cf. The law of gene technology). The absence of technological determinism is 
what I refer to as the shared political platform, where the shared standpoint is the 
acknowledgement that we need to regulate the development and negotiate a legislation 
that prohibits human cloning. A shared political platform does not imply complete 
agreement (Cf. the alternative proposition made by the Liberal People’s Party), but it is 
still shared in as much as it overlaps the traditional party lines. 
 
The fear that gene technology arises is fear of the bad impact it can have on our health 
and on the environment, but it is also fear that we will end up lagging behind a 
development that can serve mankind. This last concern involves the fear that we will be 
unable to influence the big nations and the super-national legislation, and also the fear 
that scepticism among the consumers may damage the sales-potential of certain products. 
Another cause for concern is whether guidelines and legislation have any real power as 
tools to control research communities. If the ethical guidelines are to be effective, they 
have to be ahead of the scientific practice that goes on in the laboratories. If they are not 
ahead of the development, the scientists with their expertise might as well set the 
standard for the development (Stortinget, 07.03., 1997:8). This situation is not desirable 
from the point of view of the shared political platform. There is no absolute consensus in 
the Storting on the issue of whether the existing legislation is adequate and whether the 
legislation is ahead of the development. This is evident from a proposition to ban animal 
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 cloning and cloning of higher organisms. As I have already said, the majority voted 
against human cloning, but as for animals the question remains undecided (Cf. 
Besl.O.nr.27 (1997-1998)). All in all, in spite of the fact that the different positions 
propose different strategies, there is still agreement on the point that the legislation 
should be used to prevent unwanted effects of the technological development. This is 
clear from the law that prohibits the production of genetically identical individuals, which 
was passed on February 23, 1998. In other words, the common political denominate is 
not based on technicism. The new technology is not seen as a technology with an inherent 
force and an autonomous character. The message of the politicians is that the technology 
will and must be controlled, and the politicians aspire to control the technology so that it 
is consistent with sustainable development and ethical standards. 
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 CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSION 
Throughout my study I have tried to show the utility of analysing the political debate on 
cloning in terms of the three ideal types. A few findings are worth mentioning in this 
context. I will take a closer look on four points in particular here in the conclusion of my 
study to prove this utility. The first point I am going to make is related to the positioning 
of the debate within the framework of the three ideal-types. The arguments of the 
religious and scientific ideal-types are obviously present in the debate. My second point 
is related to the aesthetic ideal-type, which is hardly noticeable in the debate. My third 
point is that rather in three separate ways, the debate reveals a shared political platform 
that sometimes overlap the different ideal-types. I think there is a connection between 
stringent legislation and the shared political platform, and that the stringent legislation 
can be explained by the absence of the technisism and fascination for technology that is 
typical of the aesthetic ideal-type. 
 
5.1 – POSITIONING THE DEBATE 
I will start by explaining why the debate belongs within the framework of the three ideal- 
types. The religious and the scientific ideal-types are obviously present in the debate, 
whereas the aesthetic ideal-type is hardly present at all. 
 
The ostentatious presence of the scientific ideal-type, especially in the debate on research, 
is worth our attention. In the interpellation the Minister of Environmental matters would 
take the necessary measure to establish an independent research unit with view to the best 
interests of society. This is analogous to the perspective of change through education to 
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 escape the ’culture of ignorance’ that is typical of the scientific ideal-type. The question 
asked at the outset of the debate can therefore be seen in terms of the scientific ideal-type. 
That there is a need for an independent research institution, and that independent research 
is more useful to society are fundamental assumption in Meltveit Kleppa’s question to the 
Minister of Environmental Matters. The assumption that independent research is useful to 
society is related to the scientific ideal-type. Behind the political steps taken towards 
independent research one can sense the desire to maintain the neutrality of science and 
technology with respect to ethics. These steps are also seen as useful to society. 
Independent research can increase our knowledge and inform the public, and in this way 
maximize the benefits and minimize the negative effects of genetics. The proposition to 
establish an independent research institution is telling of a positivist attitude towards 
knowledge. It presupposes that science can be neutral and that we can under certain 
circumstances we can have objective knowledge of ethics. The independent research can 
have no ties to commercial interests, and conduct their work exclusively with view to the 
ethical, environmental and health-related consequences of their work. In addition we 
need an exchange of scientific information between ethical and practical research 
instances. This exchange of information might compensate for the insecurity concerning 
the technology and the technological development. This proposition also reveals a desire 
to control research to make sure it is conducted in a way that is ethically sound. This is on 
a par with the scientific ideal-type arguments according to which the ’culture of 
ignorance’ is the greatest threat. Ignorance should be countered by the creation of an 
informed culture. The political strategy in the area of research reveals the aspiration for 
an informed culture. From the perspective of the scientific ideal-type research is ethical if 
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 its consequences are in the best interests of society. As I have pointed out in my analysis, 
this consequentialist attitude is related to the cautiousness principle, which prevails 
among the politicians. While analysing the political debate on cloning, I have tried to 
show that the arguments of the scientific ideal-type can explain the better safe than sorry-
attitude among the politicians, their wish for independent research the way they look 
upon information and knowledge in general. 
 
The arguments of the scientific ideal type are very conspicuous in Arnstad’s 
interpellation. She makes the need for stringent laws that prohibit human and animal 
cloning the premises of her argument. She bases her reasoning on the Christian 
conception of man. And in this context protecting human identity and integrity consists in 
protecting human genetic material. The debate puts the need for new laws on the agenda, 
and this need is based on the fundamental assumption that an ethical boundary was 
crossed with the cloning of Dolly. Some of the opposition against cloning springs from 
the fundamental assumption that man is an end in self, that cloning is inherently unethical 
and that this technology represents a threat irrespective of its use. The religious ideal-type 
makes the ethical unacceptability of cloning a premise in their arguments, because the 
dignity and position of man is threatened by the new technology. The new technology 
represents a threat, not just through its use and the extension of its use to new areas, but 
mainly because the technology itself is inscribed with ethics. This outlook on the 
technology of cloning is very different the view of the scientific ideal-type, according to 
which the technology is ethically neutral. The domineering presence of the religious 
ideal-type in the debate can be explained by the controversial experiment that resulted in 
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 the cloning of Dolly. This experiment put the issue of ethical boundaries on the political 
agenda in Norway. And as I have indicated, several politicians base their arguments on 
the premise that our nations Christian and humanist legacy should be the basis on which 
to decide what is right and wrong with respect to biotechnology. The politicians are not 
of one mind as to the question of where to draw the line, i.e. if a prohibition should apply 
to animal as well as human cloning. Arnstad is clearly in favour of prohibiting both 
human and animal cloning. For this reason she is the politician who is most 
representative of the religious ideal- type position.      
 
In my analysis I have tried to show that the arguments of the politicians, particularly the 
ones concerning the position of man and the question of where to draw the line, if we are 
not to ban cloning altogether, can be placed in the category of the religious ideal-type. 
These arguments bring up the question of what it means to be human, which is the basic 
question of the religious ideal-type. According to the religious ideal-type man is an end in 
self and has a fundamental an inviolable dignity. In this perspective, cloning and gene 
technology remains a threat to human life. And as I have shown in my analysis of the 
political debate, the religious ideal-type takes on the most restrictive and critical attitude 
towards gene technology. Both the religious and the scientific idea- type play an 
important part in the political debate on cloning. I have tried to show that the politicians’ 
critical attitude towards cloning and their desire to regulate the technological 
development are phenomenon that can be explained in terms of the religious as well as 
the scientific ideal-type. The preponderance of the scientific and the religious ideal-type 
can be explained by the perspective of risk that the politicians share. It is the focus on 
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 risks and threats to human life rather than the optimistic faith in technology typical of the 
aesthetic ideal-type position that is characteristic of the debate. The restrictive and critical 
attitude towards gene technology and the unanimous demand for regulation constitutes 
the shared political platform. I have tried to show this by pointing out the fact that the 
aesthetic ideal-type position, characterized as the unconditional faith in technology, is 
hardly noticeable in the political debate on cloning.  
 
5.2 – THE ABSENCE OF THE AESTHETIC IDEAL TYPE 
The Norwegian debate on cloning is characterized by a general reluctance to accept 
cloning, rather than by fascination for technology. The aesthetic ideal-type is defined as 
the unconditional faith in technology and the possibilities it gives us, and is ultimately, as 
opposed to the other two ideal-types, not concerned about ethical issues. It is not 
surprising therefore that the aesthetic ideal-type is absent from the Norwegian political 
debate on cloning, given the fact that our Christian and humanist cultural legacy is 
referred to throughout the debate (Cf. The law on biotechnology and genetics). The 
politicians are proud of the fact that our legislation on this area is among the stringent in 
the world, and they want to continue working to keep up the strict guidelines on research 
and cloning used for medical purposes. This has to do with the politicians’ will to stay a 
head of the rest of the world when it comes to regulating the technological development, 
because they want to give other countries a wake-up call and make a good example to 
other countries. They want to put cloning on the political agenda internationally, and they 
want to influence the EU-authorities, but also secure the fulfilment of the intentions of 
our national guidelines. The fact that the aesthetic ideal-type is so unconscious in the 
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 Norwegian legislative debate raises the question of whether this is something that is 
particular for Norway, or whether it is a general tendency in the rest of the world as well. 
Maybe the aesthetic ideal-type is inadequate as an analytical tool, or maybe this absence 
of the aesthetic ideal type is something that is characteristic only of the debate on 
biotechnology and genetics? As to the first question, UNESCO has written a declaration 
on the protection of human genes. The declaration mentions cloning and labels it as 
research that is incompatible with human dignity (Innst.O.nr.22 (1997-1998)). The 
director general of WHO, has condemned human cloning as ethically unacceptable and in 
violation of fundamental principles of reproductive technology (Ibid). And an advisory 
comity put together by the EU commission has recommended that EU condemn human 
cloning (Ibid). The recommendation of strict guidelines on human cloning is evidently 
not something that is peculiar to Norway. As to the second question, of whether the 
aesthetic ideal-type is an adequate analytical tool, I think the answer lies in the extreme 
position and unconditional faith in science and technology that is characteristic of this 
ideal-type. This extreme position is difficult to adjust to the restrictive, precautionary 
principle, better safe than sorry, that is so prevalent in the legislative process. The 
aesthetic ideal-type is overshadowed by the information of the scientific ideal-type and 
the moral concerns of the religious ideal-type. The third question is whether this is 
something that is particular to this debate (the debate on bio-technology and genetics) 
alone. What is particular to the technology of cloning is that it is new and controversial. 
The technology of cloning involves human life in a different way than for instance 
Information and Communication Technology, ICT. The fascination for technology is 
probably less controversial with regard to the ICT politics than what is the case with the 
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 debate on cloning. The absence of the fascination for technology that is typical of the 
aesthetic ideal-type can in turn help to explain the stringent legislation, and the fact that 
the scientific and the religious ideal-types join their forces on a shared political platform. 
 
5.3 – A SHARED POLITICAL PLATFORM 
It is evident form my analysis of the debate in terms of the three ideal-types, that the 
debate is not marked by division, but reveals a shared political platform that partly 
overlaps the dividing lines between the ideal-types. One would expect that there were 
three types of arguments, given the fact that the analysis is based on three cultural ideal-
types. As far as the political debate on cloning is concerned it is not evident that there are 
three different kinds of political arguments relating to the issue of cloning. There is a 
shared political platform that has a broader range than the three ideal-types. This is 
because the motivation behind the different arguments is more or less the same. This 
motivation is obviously to regulate and control the development within gene technology. 
 
The religious and the scientific ideal type positions present different arguments, but they 
both contribute to the building of a political platform from which to work out a policy in 
the area of gene technology. The contribution of the scientific ideal-type consists in the 
precautionary principle (the better safe than sorry-attitude) and the consequentialist 
attitude. The religious ideal-type contributes with its presupposed values concerning 
humans and technology. These values are based on the thought that man has a right to be 
protected from technological interference because man is autonomous and has inherent 
worth as he is created in God’s image, and the thought that the technology of cloning is 
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 by nature ethically questionable because it represents a threat to the sanctity of man. Even 
if the arguments in favour of regulating and checking the development of gene 
technology of the two ideal type positions are justified on different grounds, they are still 
marked by the same motivation to lead a strict policy on this area. Both the religious and 
the scientific ideal type position are in favour of prohibiting animal as well as human 
cloning because they see cloning as a threat to human life and the future of mankind. 
 
The debate on cloning will be remembered as a debate on values carried out from the 
basis of a shared political platform, where the discussion of ethics was a part of the 
legislative process. This process of turning ethics into politics takes place from the basis 
of a shared political platform where the arguments of the religious ideal-type position is 
most clearly representative of traditional ethics, while the scientific ideal-type position is 
more concerned about what is in the best interests of society. By the notion ’ turning 
ethics into politics’ I mean that ethics are negotiated. The Norwegian political debate on 
cloning is rooted in a Christian and humanist system of values, which serves as a basis 
for all the political parties. The debate in the Storting is based on a shared ethical 
platform. But there are still differences between the religious and the ideal-type position. 
It may not come as a surprise that the arguments of the religious ideal-type position 
draws on deontological ethics, whereas the arguments of the scientific ideal type position 
draws on consequentialist ethics. But the religious and the scientific ideal type position 
both take a stand with respect to ethics, which makes these two positions different from 
the aesthetic ideal-type position.   
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 In other words, the way I see it, there exists a political platform with room for both the 
scientific and the religious ideal-type arguments. I have tried to show that the usefulness 
of analysing the debate on cloning with view to the three ideal-types, since the areas 
where they converge are just as interesting as the points where they diverge. I have not 
presupposed the existence of the party lines, but tried to show analyse the debate on 
cloning without taking party lines into consideration. The three ideal types have been 
useful in this respect, because, the way I interpret the arguments of the politicians, the 
arguments seem to arise from a shared political platform. This platform erases the 
traditional party lines in as much as some arguments overlap the party lines and 
compliment each other. An interesting aspect of analysing the debate in terms of the three 
ideal-types is that one might be more attentive to the fact that political arguments often 
overlap the traditional party lines when important issues are discussed. Rather than party 
lines, what comes to light in the discussion are the fundamental assumptions and implicit 
values of the politicians. With my study I have tried to disclose the political process, and 
thereby discover the underlying assumptions behind the different arguments of the debate 
on cloning.  
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